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The year 2025 proved transformative for African intelligence services, marked by extraordinary violence in Tanzania, leadership transitions across 15 countries, and institutional reforms redefining accountability frameworks. From Tanzania’s spy agency deployment against civilians to South Africa’s historic restructuring, these developments illuminate intelligence apparatus at the intersection of state power and human rights.

1. 🇹🇿 Tanzania: TISS’s Role in Election Massacres and Ongoing Abductions

The Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service emerged as the principal instrument of President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s authoritarian consolidation following the disputed October 2025 elections. TISS operatives coordinated systematic attacks on opposition strongholds resulting in mass casualties, enforced disappearances, and sustained political terror campaigns.

The service’s operational footprint extended beyond intelligence gathering to direct participation in extrajudicial killings. Multiple credible reports document TISS agents executing targeted abductions of opposition figures, civil society leaders, and journalists who documented electoral fraud, all occurring with impunity under presidential directives.

Most alarming is evidence suggesting President Hassan’s son, Abdul Halim Hafidh Ameir, exercises informal control over TISS operations despite holding no official position. This shadow command structure creates parallel authority chains bypassing constitutional safeguards and concentrating extralegal powers within the presidential family.

International observers documented systematic patterns suggesting TISS coordination of the October massacres: pre-positioned operatives in opposition areas, targeted communications blackouts preceding attacks, and post-violence intelligence sweeps suppressing documentation of atrocities. These operational hallmarks indicate planning at the highest security apparatus levels.

2. 🇨🇩 DRC: ANR Establishes Economic Security Department

In March 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Agence Nationale de Renseignements created a specialised Economic Security Department, expanding its mandate into strategic economic sectors including mining, energy, telecommunications, banking, and digital finance.

The department monitors illicit financial flows, tracks economic crimes, and ensures critical sector protection from foreign interference and corruption. It plays growing roles in cyber surveillance and overseeing private sector compliance, particularly in natural resources and infrastructure. This signals ANR’s evolution from political intelligence into broader state economic security instrument, though expansion raises concerns given ANR’s documented history of arbitrary arrests, torture, and political intimidation.

3. 🇲🇼 Malawi: Brigadier Blaise Saenda Appointed NIS Director-General

President Peter Mutharika appointed Brigadier Blaise Saenda as National Intelligence Service Director-General in October 2025, replacing Dokani Ngwira whose contract expired in November 2024.

Saenda brings military intelligence experience from serving as Director of Military Operations in the Malawi Defence Force and Commander of the 93rd Brigade. The appointment marks a shift towards military professionalism following criticism of Ngwira’s tenure. The new spy chief faces immediate challenges including operational capacity constraints, with district offices reportedly lacking basic resources such as vehicles.

4. 🇲🇿 Mozambique: José Pacheco Takes Helm at SISE

President Daniel Chapo appointed José Pacheco as Serviço de Informações e Segurança do Estado Director-General on 17 June 2025, filling a vacancy since Bernardo Lidimba’s November 2024 death in a car accident. Sworn in on 18 June, Pacheco brings government experience as former Agriculture Minister, Interior Minister, Foreign Minister, and Cabo Delgado Governor (1998-2005).

The appointment followed extraordinary SISE leadership turnover: Lagos Henriques Lidimo (January, replacing imprisoned Gregório Leão José), Julio dos Santos Jane (April, when Lidimo fell ill), then Pacheco after Jane’s transfer to Armed Forces Chief of Staff—three directors in six months. President Chapo instructed Pacheco to prioritise the Cabo Delgado insurgency, organised crime, and political subversion.

5. 🇰🇪 Kenya: Spy Chief Noordin Haji’s Historic Public Lecture

In March 2025, National Intelligence Service Director-General Noordin Haji delivered an unprecedented public lecture, breaking decades of silence by Kenya’s intelligence leadership. The address marked the first time a serving NIS director engaged openly with citizens on intelligence matters.

Haji, who assumed office in June 2023 as the first civilian NIS chief in over two decades, discussed intelligence reform, oversight mechanisms, and the service’s role in democratic governance. The lecture set a continental precedent for intelligence transparency and occurred as Kenya’s intelligence community faced scrutiny over counter-terrorism operations and regional security cooperation.

6. 🇲🇦 Morocco: Deputy DGED Director Flees to Spain

General Abdelkader Haddad, known as “Nacer El Djinn,” fled Algeria by speedboat on 18-19 September 2025 to Alicante, Spain. Haddad had served as Algeria’s DGSI Director-General before May 2025 dismissal.

His dramatic escape triggered a massive manhunt and Algiers lockdown as authorities sought to prevent defection of a man holding 35 years of regime secrets. Conflicting October reports suggested Haddad’s arrest in Algiers, though independent confirmation remained elusive. The fugitive spymaster’s flight represents an extraordinary intelligence crisis for Algeria, potentially exposing sensitive information about domestic surveillance, regional cooperation, and security apparatus inner workings.

7. 🇿🇼 Zimbabwe: Dr. Fulton Mangwanya Appointed CIO Director-General

President Emmerson Mnangagwa appointed Dr. Fulton Mangwanya as Central Intelligence Organisation Director-General on 4 January 2025, replacing Isaac Moyo in a broader security sector reshuffle. Mangwanya, Zimbabwe Parks Director-General (2015-2025), has been a CIO officer since 1988.

The reshuffle came during economic crisis and political tension, with analysts suggesting Mnangagwa sought to install loyalists in strategic positions ahead of potential ZANU-PF succession battles.

8. 🇿🇦 South Africa: Intelligence Reform and Inspector-General Suspended

South Africa experienced dramatic intelligence upheaval in 2025. President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill on 28 March, dismantling the State Security Agency and creating two entities: the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Domestic Intelligence Agency.

The reforms implemented recommendations from the 2018 High-Level Review Panel and Zondo Commission on State Capture, addressing years of political abuse and financial mismanagement. The law re-established the South African National Academy of Intelligence and strengthened oversight mechanisms.

In October, Ramaphosa suspended Inspector-General of Intelligence Imtiaz Fazel pending parliamentary investigation into his conduct. Appointed November 2022 with a term to October 2027, Fazel oversees intelligence services’ legal compliance. Combined with structural reforms, these developments represented the most significant intelligence overhaul since 1994.

9. 🇬🇭 Ghana: Charles Kipo Takes Charge of NIB

President John Dramani Mahama appointed Charles Alhassan Kipo as National Intelligence Bureau Director-General on 14-15 January 2025, immediately following his inauguration. Kipo replaced Nana Attobrah Quaicoe, who resigned amidst a land scandal. The appointment formed part of Mahama’s initial security sector appointments, with Kipo’s mandate including restoring professional credibility following corruption allegations during the previous administration.

10. 🇧🇼 Botswana: DIS Chief Marries Fellow Intelligence Officer

In December 2025, Brigadier (Rtd) Peter Fana Magosi, Directorate of Intelligence and Security Director-General since 2018, married senior officer Tshepo Thupa. The marriage highlighted the professionalised nature of Botswana’s intelligence services, where career officers develop long-term institutional commitments. Magosi’s continued tenure through multiple political transitions demonstrates DIS’s relative insulation from political interference compared to neighbouring intelligence services.

11. 🇺🇬 Uganda: Arthur Mugyenyi Appointed ISO Director-General

President Yoweri Museveni appointed Arthur Mugyenyi as Internal Security Organisation Director-General on 1 April 2025, filling a vacancy created by Brigadier General Charles Oluka’s death on 29 January. Tony Kinyera Apecu was simultaneously appointed Deputy Director-General. Mugyenyi, from Kiruhura District, previously served as Director of Political Intelligence and District ISO coordinator in multiple locations, replacing Colonel Emma Katabazi who was transferred to Foreign Affairs.

12. 🇪🇹 Ethiopia: Redwan Hussein Named NISS Director

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed Redwan Hussein as National Intelligence and Security Service Director on 12 May 2025. Hussein previously served as National Security Advisor, bringing insider knowledge of security policy priorities. Simultaneously, Tigist Hamid was appointed Information Network Security Administration Director, whilst former intelligence chief Temesgen Tiruneh was promoted to Deputy Prime Minister.

13. 🇩🇿 Algeria: General “Hassan” Takes DGSI Helm

Army Chief of Staff General Saïd Chengriha installed General Abdelkader Ait Ouarabi (”General Hassan”) as DGSI Director-General on 24 May 2025. The 78-year-old counterterrorism veteran replaced Abdelkader Haddad following his dismissal. Hassan’s controversial appointment—imprisoned 2015-2019 before acquittal, linked to the 2013 Tiguentourine hostage crisis—marked President Tebboune’s fifth DGSI director, reflecting persistent leadership turbulence.

14. 🇸🇸 South Sudan: Gen. Charles Chiec Mayor Confirmed as NSS Chief

The South Sudanese government confirmed General Charles Chiec Mayor as National Security Service Director-General on 17 February 2025, following a week serving as acting director. He replaced Akec Tong Aleu, dismissed on 10 February.

Mayor previously served as Deputy Director-General for Administration and Finance, representing continuity in NSS leadership structures. Lieutenant General Chol Agoth Deng was appointed Deputy DG for Administration and Finance, completing the leadership transition. This marked the third NSS leadership change since South Sudan’s 2011 independence.

15. 🇩🇿 Algeria-France: Intelligence Dispute Over Journalist

Algeria and France became embroiled in a fresh intelligence crisis when Algerian authorities accused French intelligence of recruiting an Algerian journalist. The dispute escalated beyond typical diplomatic tensions, touching core sovereignty concerns about foreign intelligence operations on Algerian soil.

The confrontation reflected deeper strains in Algeria-France relations, where intelligence cooperation oscillates between pragmatic counter-terrorism coordination and mutual suspicion rooted in colonial history. Both countries’ services maintain extensive surveillance of each other’s activities, particularly regarding Algerian diaspora communities in France.

16. 🇸🇴 Somalia: Mahad Salad Returns to NISA Leadership

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud reappointed Mahad Mohamed Salad as National Intelligence and Security Agency Director-General on 1 June 2025, with Salad officially assuming office on 14 June. He replaced Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Sanbaloolshe” after previously serving from August 2022 to April 2024.

Salad’s return proved controversial given documented human rights abuses against journalists during his earlier tenure. His reappointment signalled presidential prioritisation of operational experience over human rights considerations as Somalia confronts escalating Al-Shabaab threats and internal political fragmentation.

17. 🇸🇴 Somalia: Al-Shabaab Storms NISA Prison

On 4 October 2025, Al-Shabaab militants attacked the Godka Jilacow prison operated by NISA in Mogadishu’s Bondhere district, metres from the presidential palace. Seven attackers used a suicide car bomb disguised as a NISA vehicle and wore Somali security uniforms to breach the high-security facility.

The assault, part of Operation “Support for the Oppressed,” lasted six hours before government forces regained control. All seven militants died in the siege. The attack demonstrated Al-Shabaab’s continuing ability to penetrate Mogadishu’s security architecture and exposed vulnerabilities in checkpoint inspection procedures.

Significantly, the attack occurred hours after the government lifted security restrictions on 50+ roads to demonstrate improved security conditions—an ironic counterpoint to the militants’ demonstration of operational capability deep within the capital’s most protected zone.

18. 🇳🇬 Nigeria: DSS Reforms Under Ajayi Leadership

Oluwatosin Adeola Ajayi, appointed Department of State Services Director-General in August 2024, drove significant institutional reforms throughout 2025. The service shifted from reactive enforcement towards intelligence-driven prevention, focusing on penetrating terrorist cells and disrupting kidnapping syndicates.

Critically, Ajayi appointed Nigeria’s first female Deputy Director-General, signalling institutional maturity and merit-based advancement. The DSS also reviewed legacy detention cases, releasing individuals held without legal basis and complying with court compensation orders—actions that attracted commendation from legal practitioners and civil society.

The Nigerian National Committee of the International Press Institute recognised Ajayi as a champion of press freedom in 2025, noting improved media engagement and restraint on press-related security issues. This represented a significant departure from DSS’s historically adversarial relationship with journalists.

19. 🇿🇦 South Africa: SSA Leadership Changes

The restructuring of South Africa’s intelligence services created uncertainty around senior leadership positions at the former State Security Agency. Whilst Ambassador Gloria Nozuko Bam and Ambassador Tony “Gab” Msimanga featured in leadership discussions, the precise allocation of Director-General positions for the new Foreign Intelligence Service and Domestic Intelligence Agency remained subject to ongoing government processes at year’s end.

The opacity surrounding appointments reflected broader challenges in implementing the intelligence reform legislation, including bureaucratic resistance, budget allocation disputes, and political manoeuvring over control of the reconstituted agencies.

20. 🇱🇾 Libya: Assassination of Intelligence-Linked Militia Leader

Intelligence-backed forces killed Abdulghani al-Kikli (Ghnewa), head of the Stability Support Apparatus, in a May 2025 Tripoli ambush. Military Intelligence Directorate director Mahmoud Hamza confirmed involvement in the “precise operation,” which formed part of Government of National Unity efforts to consolidate intelligence-military power.

The targeted killing of Ghnewa, who commanded one of Tripoli’s most powerful militias, demonstrated the increasing willingness of Libya’s competing intelligence factions to employ lethal force against rivals. His Stability Support Apparatus had operated with substantial autonomy, creating parallel security structures that challenged GNU authority in western Libya.

The assassination exposed deep fractures within Libya’s intelligence architecture, where multiple services aligned with different governments compete for control. The Military Intelligence Directorate’s public acknowledgement of responsibility signalled confidence in its operational capacity whilst raising questions about extrajudicial killings masquerading as intelligence operations.

21. 🇷🇼 Rwanda: Intelligence Command of M23 Rebel Operations

United Nations experts confirmed Rwanda’s Defence Intelligence Directorate maintains “command and control” over M23 rebels, with 3,000-4,000 Rwandan Defence Force troops embedded in eastern DRC throughout 2025. The January capture of Goma demonstrated sophisticated intelligence capabilities including electronic warfare disrupting Congolese communications, real-time drone reconnaissance, and intelligence-based targeting of enemy concentrations.

Rwanda’s Defence Intelligence established a transnational recruitment network in refugee camps including Mahama, Gisagara, and Kizimba, coercively recruiting Congolese refugees for M23 operations. The rebels operate sophisticated intelligence infrastructure including signals intelligence units, human intelligence networks deep in Congolese territory, and counterintelligence cells protecting command structures.

Most significantly, UN investigators obtained evidence that Rwandan officials informed them weeks before the offensive that President Kagame had decided to capture both Goma and Bukavu. This advance notification suggests extraordinary confidence in intelligence capabilities and military superiority, whilst demonstrating Rwanda’s intelligence service operates as a strategic instrument projecting power beyond national borders.

M23’s intelligence proficiency—attributable to Rwandan direction—represents a qualitative leap in non-state armed group capabilities in Central Africa. The seamless integration of signals intelligence, drone surveillance, and human networks created operational advantages that overwhelmed Congolese forces despite substantial numerical superiority.

22. 🇱🇾 Libya: Intelligence Fragmentation and Foreign Penetration

Libya’s multiple intelligence services, aligned with competing governments in Tripoli and Benghazi, continued serving as proxies for Turkish, Emirati, Egyptian, and Russian intelligence agencies throughout 2025. This fragmentation creates overlapping jurisdictions, competing loyalties, and intelligence warfare that undermines any possibility of unified national security apparatus.

The General Intelligence Service in western Libya maintains close cooperation with Turkish intelligence (MIT), receiving training, equipment, and operational support. Meanwhile, eastern Libya’s intelligence structures coordinate extensively with UAE and Egyptian services, creating parallel intelligence architectures that reflect geopolitical competition rather than Libyan national interests.

Russian military intelligence (GRU) maintains presence through Wagner Group remnants and direct military installations, conducting surveillance operations that serve Moscow’s Mediterranean and Sahel strategic objectives. These foreign intelligence agencies don’t merely advise Libyan counterparts—they often direct operations, control information flows, and exploit Libya’s intelligence vacuum to advance external agendas.

The intelligence fragmentation has profound security implications extending beyond Libya. Competing services facilitate arms trafficking, human smuggling networks, and militant movements that destabilise the Sahel whilst creating intelligence blind spots that terrorist organisations exploit. Foreign intelligence penetration transforms Libya into a theatre where regional powers conduct covert operations whilst Libyan institutions remain too fractured to assert sovereignty over their own territory.

23. 🇪🇹 Ethiopia: Mass Arrest of Eritreans in Addis Ababa

Ethiopian security services detained 224 Eritreans in Addis Ababa in April 2025 as part of broader security operations across the capital. The arrests occurred alongside detention of 365 Ethiopians linked to Fano forces in Amhara region and others connected to forces in Tigray and Oromia regions, totalling over 900 individuals.

Addis Ababa City Peace and Security Administration accused the detained Eritreans of operating “on a mission” from the Eritrean government, though specific details of alleged activities remained unspecified. The mass detentions occurred against deteriorating Ethiopia-Eritrea relations following the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement.

The security sweep reflected Ethiopian authorities’ heightened concern about foreign intelligence activities in the capital, particularly as tensions increased over Ethiopia’s demand for Red Sea access and Eritrea’s reported cooperation with dissident TPLF factions. Ethiopian counterintelligence operations increasingly focused on potential Eritrean intelligence presence despite the two countries’ recent partnership during the Tigray conflict.

24. 🇨🇲 🇳🇬 Boko Haram Intelligence Networks Drive Lake Chad Basin Resurgence

Islamic State West Africa Province and Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad demonstrated sophisticated intelligence capabilities throughout 2025, using surveillance drones, WhatsApp-based intelligence sharing, and infiltration of security forces across the Lake Chad Basin.

On 11 May 2025, Cameroon’s army shot down three ISWAP reconnaissance drones flying over Mayo-Tsanaga, exposing the group’s aerial surveillance operations. Since launching its Camp Holocaust offensive in early 2025, ISWAP conducted over 200 attacks killing at least 500 people, with operations preceded by extensive espionage employing both military hisbah (police service) units and civilian informant networks.

Boko Haram factions maintain specialised intelligence services with designated internal units that collect tactical information through family members, friends, and relatives who lead double lives between communities and insurgent camps. The groups exploit gaps in disarmament programmes, recruit informants amongst fishers and herders accessing ISWAP-controlled Lake Chad islands, and use undercover agents sharing images of civilian and military targets via encrypted messaging platforms.

This intelligence infrastructure enables Boko Haram to acquire accurate information on soldier deployments, weapons calibres, movement schedules, and base layouts—capabilities that have fuelled the deadliest terrorist resurgence in the region’s history.

25. 🇳🇪 Niger Terminates Intelligence Cooperation with Russia and Turkey

Niger’s military junta abruptly ended intelligence cooperation with Russia and Turkey in May 2025, exposing deep security vulnerabilities following the July 2023 coup. The Direction Générale de la Documentation et de la Sécurité Extérieure cited poor performance of Russian and Turkish surveillance systems, particularly their failure to effectively intercept telephone and digital communications.

Military authorities reported frequent equipment malfunctions and weak encryption capabilities that fell far short of operational needs for counterterrorism against Islamic State Sahel Province and JNIM insurgents. Niger contracted a Moroccan private firm specialising in cyber-espionage to rebuild digital surveillance capabilities, but swiftly dismantled the system after discovering indirect links to French service providers—politically untenable following the coup’s anti-Western stance.

The termination left Niger without functional surveillance infrastructure. In response, the Presidential Guard assumed domestic intelligence duties despite lacking formal training, launching plainclothes night patrols on foot and unmarked motorcycles between midnight and 6:00 a.m. across sensitive Niamey locations including government ministries, the diplomatic quarter, and strategic roundabouts.

The intelligence vacuum occurred as Niger faced mounting terrorism threats, with 4.8 million people requiring humanitarian aid and nearly one million displaced persons concentrated in conflict zones. While Niger maintains military-industrial ties with Russia through a regional agreement with Mali and Burkina Faso for satellite-based surveillance services, the intelligence cooperation breakdown underscored the junta’s deteriorating security capacity.

Conclusion: Intelligence at the Crossroads

The 2025 intelligence landscape revealed African spy agencies on divergent trajectories. Whilst South Africa pursued transparency and reform, Tanzania deployed its intelligence service for mass repression. Kenya’s spy chief spoke publicly about accountability even as Uganda intensified political surveillance.

Leadership transitions dominated the year, with 15 countries appointing new intelligence chiefs—the highest annual turnover in continental history. These changes occurred against evolving threats including terrorism, organised crime, cyber attacks, and political instability demanding sophisticated intelligence responses.

Yet the Tanzania case stands as 2025’s defining intelligence story: a stark illustration of how professional intelligence services transform into state terror instruments when unchecked by judicial oversight, parliamentary scrutiny, or human rights respect. As TISS operatives conducted massacres and abductions, they demonstrated that Africa’s intelligence challenge extends beyond capacity-building to fundamental accountability and rule of law questions.

The continent’s intelligence services will spend 2026 navigating tensions between security imperatives and democratic governance. Whether they emerge as constitutional order protectors or authoritarian consolidation instruments will define not just intelligence reform but African democracy itself.

Ujasusi Blog

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