Over 1,000 Terrorist Groups in Africa – An Intelligence Brief on the Urgent Security Challenge
Ujasusi Blog’s Terrorism Monitor Desk | 26 August 2025 | 0335 BST
Executive Summary
The recent disclosure by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, Nigeria’s former Permanent Representative to the United Nations, that over 1,000 terrorist groups are now active across the African continent, represents a watershed moment in understanding contemporary security threats. This figure, revealed at the African Chiefs of Defence Staff Summit in Abuja, moves the discourse beyond well-known insurgencies to a reality of extreme fragmentation and localised violence. This comprehensive intelligence brief provides a deep dive into this alarming declaration.
We analyse the credibility of the source and the context of the summit, themed on “Strategic Defence Collaboration.” The brief provides a detailed typology of terrorist groups, breaking down the threat by major African regions—the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, East Africa, and Southern Africa. We investigate the root causes and enablers of this proliferation, from governance failures to the impact of climate change and external actor involvement.
Crucially, this document moves beyond diagnosis to prescription. It expands on Prof. Gambari’s call to action, outlining a robust framework for a new African security doctrine built on two pillars: enhanced military and intelligence cooperation and the critical development of indigenous defence capabilities and homegrown security solutions. This brief is essential reading for policymakers, security professionals, investors, and analysts engaged with African stability and development.
1.0 Introduction: A Continent at a Crossroads
The image of African terrorism has long been dominated by the spectres of Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and Islamic State affiliates. However, the declaration of a four-digit figure of active groups signifies a fundamental shift. This is not merely an increase in numbers but a transformation in the very nature of the threat. The landscape is now characterised by:
Fragmentation: Large groups splintering into competing factions.
Localisation: Hyper-local militias with community-specific grievances.
Networked Collaboration: Alliances of convenience between ideologically disparate groups.
Criminal Convergence: Blurring lines between terrorism, organised crime, and banditry.
This briefing unpacks this complex ecosystem, arguing that traditional, state-centric counter-terrorism (CT) approaches are obsolete. The response must be as networked, adaptive, and collaborative as the threat itself.
2.0 Source and Context: The Abuja Summit and a Call to Arms
2.1 The Messenger: Prof. Ibrahim Gambari’s Credibility
The weight of this intelligence is borne by the stature of its source. Prof. Gambari is not merely a former diplomat; he is an international statesman with decades of experience in conflict mediation and global governance, including serving as Under-Secretary-General of the UN. This disclosure is unlikely to be a rhetorical flourish but a figure drawn from privileged intelligence briefings, UN reports, and diplomatic channels. It is a calculated intervention designed to shock the continent’s leadership into action.
2.2 The Forum: African Chiefs of Defence Staff Summit
The venue for this revelation is equally significant. The summit, gathering the continent’s top military leadership, is the highest-level platform for discussing collective security. The 2024 theme, “Combating Contemporary Threats to Regional Peace and Security in Africa: The Role of Strategic Defence Collaboration,” directly acknowledges that the existing security architecture is failing. Gambari’s message was a keynote address designed to set the tone, framing the crisis not as a series of national problems but as a singular continental emergency requiring a unified response.
3.0 Deconstructing the Threat: A Typology of 1,000 Groups
The term "terrorist group" encompasses a wide spectrum. To understand the threat, we must categorise it:
3.1 Ideologically-Driven Jihadist Groups
Description: Groups with a transnational Islamist ideology, often pledging allegiance to Al-Qaeda or ISIS.
Examples: Al-Shabaab (Somalia/E. Africa), Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM, Sahel), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) & Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).
Characteristics: Seek territorial control, impose strict sharia law, and target state institutions and international interests.
3.2 Separatist and Irredentist Militias
Description: Groups fighting for regional independence or autonomy based on ethnic or historical claims.
Examples: The various Ambazonian separatist groups in Cameroon, the Mouvement des nationalistes pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) in Mali.
Characteristics: Goals are primarily political, though tactics often include terrorism. May forge temporary alliances with jihadist groups for tactical gains.
3.3 Politico-Military Rebellions
Description: Armed groups seeking to overthrow the central government or gain political power.
Examples: Multiple armed factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (e.g., M23, ADF), various groups in the Central African Republic.
Characteristics: Often control resource-rich territories, financing operations through mining and logging.
3.4 Community-Based and Ethnically-Aligned Militias
Description: Self-defence forces or vigilante groups formed along ethnic lines, often in response to state absence or attacks from other communities.
Examples: The Dan Na Ambassagou and other Dogon and Fulani militias in Mali; the Arrow Boys in Nigeria.
Characteristics: Highly localised. It can morph from defenders into perpetrators of violence, fueling vicious cycles of communal conflict.
3.5 Predatory Criminal Networks
Description: Groups primarily engaged in illicit economies (drug trafficking, human smuggling, oil bunkering, piracy) that use extreme violence to protect their interests.
Examples: Militias in the Niger Delta, kidnapping gangs in Northwest Nigeria, pirate networks in the Gulf of Guinea.
Characteristics: Motivation is financial, not political, but their methods and destabilising impact are indistinguishable from terrorism.
4.0 Regional Threat Analysis: A Continent on Fire
The threat is not uniform. Its manifestation varies dramatically by region.
4.1 The Sahel: The Epicentre of Instability
The Sahelian region is the most acute example of the "1,000 groups" phenomenon. The collapse of state authority in parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has created a vacuum filled by a kaleidoscope of competing actors: JNIM, ISGS, numerous ethnic militias, and criminal networks. The situation is characterised by:
Rapidly escalating violence: Burkina Faso is now one of the world's worst displacement crises.
Spillover: Instability is bleeding into coastal West African nations like Benin, Togo, and Côte d'Ivoire.
International Divergence: The withdrawal of international forces (e.g., French Barkhane) and the rise of Russian Wagner Group mercenaries has added a complex geopolitical layer to the conflict.
4.2 The Lake Chad Basin: Adaptive Insurgency
Once dominated by a monolithic Boko Haram, the region now hosts two major factions: the ISIS-aligned ISWAP and the more vicious faction loyal to Abubakar Shekau until his death. ISWAP has shown concerning strategic sophistication, governing territory, providing rudimentary services, and engaging in complex military operations against regional armies. The flooded marshes of the Lake provide a perfect natural fortress, and the group’s ability to operate across the borders of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon exemplifies the need for the strategic defence collaboration championed at the Abuja summit.
4.3 East Africa: The Al-Shabaab Challenge
While Al-Shabaab remains a more cohesive entity, it is not monolithic. It faces internal fractures and competes with ISIS-linked cells in Somalia. Its threat is twofold:
Internal: It controls significant territory in rural Somalia and extracts massive revenue through taxation and extortion.
External: It demonstrates a potent ability to launch complex attacks against regional partners, notably Kenya, which is part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The group’s resilience makes it a benchmark for a successful, entrenched terrorist organisation.
4.4 Central and Southern Africa: Emerging Hotspots
While currently less affected than other regions, the warning signs are present. The protracted conflict in the eastern DRC involves dozens of militia groups. In Mozambique, the ISIS-Mozambique insurgency in Cabo Delgado province, though recently countered by regional forces, shows how quickly a resource-rich region can be destabilised by a nascent terrorist threat. This underscores that no region is immune.
5.0 Root Causes and Enablers: Why This Proliferation?
A military response alone is futile without addressing the underlying drivers.
5.1 Governance Deficits and State Fragility
The primary incubator of terrorism is the absence of effective, legitimate, and accountable governance. Corruption, marginalisation of peripheral regions, and brutal state security responses are powerful recruitment tools for terrorist groups. They position themselves as alternatives to a predatory state.
5.2 Demographic and Economic Pressures
Africa’s "youth bulge" is a potential demographic dividend but also a major risk factor. With economies unable to create sufficient jobs for a growing, young population, a vast pool of disaffected, unemployed young men becomes fertile ground for recruitment by groups offering purpose, income, and power.
5.3 Climate Change and Resource Scarcity
This is a critical, often understated, threat multiplier. Desertification in the Sahel and changing rainfall patterns have devastated pastoralist and farmer communities, intensifying competition over scarce water and land resources. This communal conflict is easily weaponised by terrorist groups who exploit these tensions to recruit and expand their influence.
5.4 The Role of External Actors
The involvement of foreign powers often complicates the security landscape. This includes:
Geopolitical Competition: Rivalry between powers like Russia, the US, China, and former colonial powers can lead to competing strategies, propping up unsavoury partners, and flooding regions with weapons.
Private Military Companies (PMCs): The Wagner Group’s involvement in Mali and the Central African Republic offers a stark alternative to Western-backed CT missions, often employing brutal tactics that can exacerbate human rights concerns and fuel anti-government sentiment.
Foreign Financing: Funding flows from diaspora communities and external ideologues in the Middle East and elsewhere, though often exaggerated, remain a concern.
6.0 The Strategic Response: Building a Resilient African Security Architecture
Prof. Gambari’s speech provides the blueprint for a response. It requires a move from reaction to proaction, from dependence to self-reliance.
6.1 Pillar I: Enhanced Military and Intelligence Cooperation
The era of isolated national armies is over. Collaboration is force multiplication.
Joint Multinational Task Forces (JMTFs): The model of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram must be strengthened, properly funded, and replicated in other regions like the Sahel. This requires:
Standardised Protocols: Common rules of engagement, communication systems, and operational procedures.
Rotational Command Structures: To build trust and ensure no single nation dominates.
Airborne and ISR Collaboration: Pooling resources for drones, surveillance aircraft, and satellite imagery analysis.
Real-Time Intelligence Fusion: Establishing permanent, regionally-based intelligence fusion centres staffed by analysts from all member states. This breaks down the paralysing silos of national intelligence agencies and allows for a unified picture of the threat. The AFISMA-CIACS in Algiers is a model to be expanded.
Coordinated Border Management: Investing in integrated surveillance systems (e.g., the AU’s Continental Structural Integration Plan - CISSA) and joint patrols along vast, porous borders to disrupt the movement of fighters, weapons, and illicit goods.
6.2 Pillar II: Fostering Indigenous Defence Capabilities and Homegrown Solutions
Over-reliance on foreign military suppliers is a strategic vulnerability. It creates dependency, drains foreign reserves, and often provides equipment ill-suited to African terrain and threats.
Reinvigorating Defence Industries: The goal must be to develop a sustainable continental defence industrial base. This involves:
Public-Private Partnerships: Governments should partner with local engineering firms and tech startups to develop tailored solutions.
Regional Specialisation: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) could be extended to defence. One region could focus on small arms production, another on vehicle manufacturing, another on communications tech.
Success Stories: Nigeria's Defence Industries Corporation (DICON) and South Africa's Denel, despite challenges, provide a foundation to build upon. Ethiopia's efforts to manufacture its own small arms are another example.
Protecting Homegrown Technologies: Africa is a hub of innovation. From Nigerian tech hubs to Kenyan fintech, this ingenuity must be directed towards security. This means:
Cybersecurity: Developing indigenous capabilities to protect critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks, which are a key tool for terrorist groups.
Low-Cost Tech Solutions: Developing affordable, solar-powered surveillance drones, secure mobile communication apps for remote armies, and data analytics tools to predict conflict outbreaks.
Legal Frameworks: Creating robust intellectual property laws to prevent foreign entities from co-opting and exploiting African innovations without benefit to the continent.
Community-Centric Security: The most effective "homegrown solution" is winning the support of the local population. This means:
Investing in Civilian-Led Early Warning Systems: Empowering local communities to report suspicious activity without fear of reprisal.
Deradicalisation and Reintegration Programs: Developing culturally appropriate programs to demobilise and reintegrate low-level fighters, breaking the cycle of violence.
Addressing Grievances: Supporting local dialogue and reconciliation processes to address the communal tensions that groups exploit.
7.0 The Imperative for a Unified Continent
The figure of over 1,000 terrorist groups is not just a statistic; it is a diagnosis of a deep-seated malaise. It reflects decades of governance challenges, economic inequality, and the failure of a fragmented international response. However, the message from Abuja is not one of despair, but of urgent opportunity.
The path forward is clear. It requires a fundamental reimagining of African security, moving away from the outdated model of the nation-state defending its borders alone. The future lies in strategic defence collaboration—a networked, continent-wide system of shared intelligence, pooled resources, and joint action. Simultaneously, Africa must invest in itself, building indigenous defence capabilities and homegrown security solutions that ensure long-term resilience and strategic autonomy.
The cost of inaction is unacceptably high: more lives lost, more communities displaced, and the reversal of decades of hard-won economic progress. The time for decisive, collective action is now. The African Chiefs of Defence Staff, heeding Prof. Gambari’s warning, must now translate the rhetoric of Abuja into the reality of a safer, more secure continent.
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