[FREE ACCESS] Intelligence Brief | Kenya’s Spy Chief Noordin Haji: The Intelligence Operator Behind Collapsed Somalia-Jubaland Mediation
Ujasusi Blog’s Horn of Africa Monitoring Team | 07 October 2025 | 0200 BST
The historic mediation talks between Somalia’s Federal Government and Jubaland collapsed within hours of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s maiden visit to Kismayo on October 5-6, 2025, despite intensive facilitation by Kenya’s National Intelligence Service Director-General Noordin Haji and former Somalia NISA chief Abdullahi Mohamed Ali “Sanbaloolshe.” The breakdown exposes the limits of intelligence-led diplomacy in resolving Somalia’s deepening federal crisis and raises critical questions about Kenya’s capacity to shape political outcomes in its volatile northern neighbour.
This intelligence brief examines Noordin Haji’s role as the principal architect of Kenya’s mediation strategy, analysing his operational approach, the intelligence dimensions of the negotiation process, and the strategic implications of the talks’ failure for regional security architecture.
🎯 Noordin Haji: Profile of Kenya’s Spymaster
Noordin Mohamed Haji, sworn in as NIS Director-General on June 14, 2023, represents a significant departure from Kenya’s intelligence leadership tradition. Unlike his military predecessors, Haji is a career intelligence officer and lawyer who joined the then-National Security Intelligence Service in 1999 and served in critical roles, including Head of Somalia Stabilisation (2010-2013), Deputy Director for Counter-Organised Crime, and Deputy Director for Administration.
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His appointment by President William Ruto broke a 24-year pattern of military officers leading Kenya’s premier intelligence agency, signalling a potential shift toward civilian oversight and legal accountability in Kenya’s security sector. Haji holds advanced degrees, including an LLM from the University of Wales and a Master’s in National Security Policy from the Australian National University, equipping him with both legal expertise and strategic security analysis capabilities.
Operational Background & Somalia Expertise
Haji’s tenure as Head of Somalia Stabilisation between 2010-2013 provides him with unparalleled institutional knowledge of Somali political dynamics, clan structures, and the complex interplay between federal and regional authorities. This background positions him uniquely to understand the nuances of the Mogadishu-Kismayo standoff and the regional implications of Ahmed Madobe’s continued defiance of federal authority.
In March 2025, Haji delivered NIS’s inaugural public lecture at the National Intelligence and Research University, articulating a vision of intelligence work that emphasises preventive security, community engagement, and addressing the socioeconomic roots of extremism. He warned that Kenya can no longer afford reactive crisis management, advocating instead for a “forward-leaning, outward-looking foreign and security policy” given Somalia’s instability and the region’s evolving threat landscape.
⚖️ Strategic Context: Kenya’s Vital Interests in Jubaland
Kenya’s decision to deploy its intelligence chief as principal mediator reflects the existential nature of its interests in Jubaland. Jubaland shares a nearly 700-kilometre border with Kenya’s Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa counties—regions that have experienced a marked surge in al-Shabaab attacks since June 2023.
Security Imperatives
Kenya’s 2011 Operation Linda Nchi intervention in Somalia was driven by multiple objectives: restoring order in Kenya’s northern frontier, establishing a buffer zone south of the River Juba, capturing Kismayo port, and leveraging cross-border Ogadeni clan ties to drive al-Shabaab into hostile terrain. Ahmed Madobe emerged as Kenya’s preferred partner in Jubaland precisely because he could deliver on these security objectives.
The Somalia-Jubaland conflict has already triggered refugee flows into Kenya, with over 5,000 Somali refugees crossing into Mandera County in August 2025 following violent clashes in Gedo region. Kenya’s nightmare scenario involves Jubaland’s collapse, creating an al-Shabaab sanctuary directly adjacent to its vulnerable northeastern counties.
Economic & Political Calculations
In May 2025, Kenya reaffirmed its recognition of Somalia’s Federal Government while maintaining the right to engage with sub-national administrations in Jubaland and Somaliland for “security cooperation and commercial interests.” This delicate balancing act reflects Kenya’s need to maintain trade corridors, manage cross-border clan dynamics, and prevent the emergence of a hostile administration in Kismayo.
🕵️ Intelligence Tradecraft: Haji’s Mediation Approach
Diplomatic sources confirmed that Haji led mediation efforts behind the scenes for several months before President Mohamud’s October visit, indicating a patient, relationship-building approach characteristic of intelligence operations rather than conventional diplomacy.
Co-Facilitation with Sanbaloolshe
The pairing of Haji with former NISA Director-General Sanbaloolshe represents strategic intelligence collaboration. Sanbaloolshe, who served as NISA chief during Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s first presidency (2014) and again in 2017, was reappointed to lead NISA in April 2024, providing institutional continuity and personal rapport with the Somali president.
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This co-facilitation model leverages complementary intelligence networks: Haji brings deep Kenyan state resources and regional diplomatic weight, while Sanbaloolshe provides insider understanding of Villa Somalia’s decision-making processes and Hassan Sheikh’s negotiating red lines.
Operational Security & Discretion
The mediation was described as “quietly brokered by Kenya,” with Kenyan troops under the African Union mission overseeing security during the president’s visit. This reflects intelligence operational security principles—minimising public exposure, controlling information flow, and creating safe negotiating space away from media scrutiny and political grandstanding.
💥 The Kismayo Talks: Anatomy of Failure
The talks ended late Sunday without a breakthrough, with both sides “firmly entrenched in their political positions.” Sources described the negotiations as “troubled,” with preliminary talks ending “without progress” despite initial optimism.
Identified Sticking Points
Two fundamental issues triggered the deadlock:
Legitimacy Recognition: Hassan Sheikh refuses to recognise Madobe as legitimately elected and demands he return to the National Consultative Council (NCC) without preconditions. Mogadishu has consistently dismissed Jubaland’s November 2024 indirect presidential election—which returned Madobe to a third term—as illegitimate, viewing it as undermining federal authority and the push toward universal suffrage.
Electoral Model Dispute: Madobe maintains Somalia should not migrate to direct elections, having fallen out with Hassan Sheikh over constitutional amendments enabling universal suffrage. The federal government is pushing for one-person-one-vote elections scheduled for May 2026, while Jubaland and Puntland advocate for the existing indirect electoral system based on clan-based power-sharing formulas.
Intelligence Assessment: Structural Incompatibility
Security analyst Rashid Abdi noted that Hassan Sheikh “fancies himself a strategist” but in creating the Northeastern Region of Somalia in contested Sool and Sanaag territories, “seems to have sawed off the shaky branch on which Mogadishu sits.” This observation highlights a fundamental problem: Hassan Sheikh’s maximalist approach to centralisation has simultaneously alienated Jubaland, Puntland, and Somaliland, leaving him with no federal partners.
🚨 Intelligence Implications & Security Risks
Limits of Intelligence-Led Mediation
The talks’ collapse despite Haji’s months-long preparation reveals the inherent limitations of intelligence mediation when political principals lack genuine commitment to compromise. Intelligence officers can create conditions for dialogue—operational security, trusted channels, confidential communications—but cannot substitute for political will.
The Kenyan mediation team is reportedly “engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy” aimed at bridging the gap, suggesting Haji’s operational pivot to damage control and exploring alternative negotiation frameworks.
Al-Shabaab Exploitation Risk
The standoff threatens to trigger “skyrocketing of Al-Shabaab militants within Lower and Middle Jubba,” the nightmare scenario that drove Kenya’s intervention in the first place. Clashes between federal and Jubaland forces create openings for al-Shabaab infiltration, with experts warning that the power struggle directly benefits the militant group.
Al-Shabaab has already exploited the ATMIS drawdown and federal-Jubaland tensions, with Jubaland experiencing nearly four times the number of clashes in July 2023 compared to the previous month.
Regional Fault Lines
Days before the Kismayo talks, Madobe, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni, and opposition leaders announced the formation of Golaha Mustaqbalka Soomaaliya (Somalia Future Council), a new opposition bloc that unifies federal opponents. This development transforms the crisis from a bilateral Mogadishu-Kismayo dispute into a multi-front challenge to federal authority.
🔮 Outlook: Kenya’s Dilemma & Haji’s Next Moves
Kenya faces an acute strategic dilemma. Supporting Mogadishu risks destabilising Jubaland and empowering al-Shabaab; backing Madobe strains relations with Somalia’s federal government and contradicts Kenya’s stated respect for Somali sovereignty. Kenya’s May 2025 policy statement attempted to navigate this by recognising federal authority while maintaining “contact with sub-national governments.”
Intelligence Options for Haji
Extended Mediation Track: Continue shuttle diplomacy while exploring face-saving compromises, possibly involving phased legitimacy recognition in exchange for Madobe’s participation in electoral framework negotiations.
Multilateral Escalation: Elevate the mediation to IGAD or African Union level, reducing Kenya’s bilateral exposure while maintaining influence through regional frameworks.
Containment Strategy: Shift focus from political settlement to security cooperation, ensuring al-Shabaab doesn’t exploit the political deadlock while hoping for changed circumstances.
Pressure Tactics: Use intelligence assets to shape conditions—controlling information flows, influencing clan dynamics, or leveraging economic pressure points—to create incentives for compromise.
📊 Bottom Line
Noordin Haji’s Somalia-Jubaland mediation effort represents sophisticated intelligence statecraft—leveraging operational security, institutional knowledge, and strategic partnerships to create negotiating conditions. Yet the talks’ rapid collapse exposes fundamental limits: intelligence officers cannot overcome incompatible political visions when principals prioritise maximalist goals over pragmatic compromise.
With government troops already deployed to Jubaland and dozens dead in previous confrontations, the failure of Haji’s mediation increases risks of renewed violence, al-Shabaab resurgence, and broader regional instability. Kenya’s intelligence chief now faces the challenge of preventing worst-case scenarios while managing Nairobi’s competing interests in maintaining both federal relations and Jubaland stability.
The episode underscores a critical intelligence lesson: operational excellence in mediation tradecraft cannot compensate for a lack of political will. As Somalia’s May 2026 elections approach, Haji’s challenge is preserving Kenya’s strategic position in an increasingly polarised Somali political landscape where the centre may not hold.
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