🔍 Manufactured Invisibility: How Modern States Hide Atrocities — And Could It Happen in Tanzania?
Ujasusi Blog’s East Africa Monitoring Team | 15 February 2026 | 0130 GMT
Between 2020 and 2022, the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region demonstrated how modern states can combine military force, communication shutdowns, access restrictions, narrative framing, and diplomatic manoeuvring to reduce international scrutiny during periods of extreme violence. Investigations by Human Rights Watch’s Tigray reports, Amnesty International’s Ethiopia documentation, and the UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia documented patterns of large-scale abuses during prolonged information blackouts and restricted humanitarian access.
The central lesson from Tigray is not merely that atrocities occurred. It is that violence unfolded within an engineered environment of limited visibility — a controlled information ecosystem in which documentation was delayed, access was mediated, and narratives were strategically shaped.
This article expands that framework into a broader intelligence concept: “manufactured invisibility.” It then assesses whether comparable mechanisms are structurally possible within Tanzania’s legal, political, diplomatic, and digital governance environment.
This is not an allegation of intent. It is a capability-based risk assessment grounded in precedent, law, and institutional structure.
🧩 The Tigray Model: Components of Invisibility
The Tigray case illustrates how invisibility can be constructed through layered mechanisms operating simultaneously across communications, territory, narrative space, and international diplomacy.
1️⃣ Communication Shutdowns
Access Now’s #KeepItOn campaign reports documented Ethiopia’s extended telecom blackout in Tigray, which lasted in various forms for nearly two years. Internet, mobile phone networks, and even electricity supply were disrupted. These measures severely limited real-time reporting, obstructed digital evidence collection, and prevented survivors from communicating with external actors.
Telecommunications infrastructure, normally treated as civilian utility, became a strategic instrument of war. When data cannot leave a conflict zone, documentation becomes retrospective rather than contemporaneous — weakening both advocacy and legal preservation.
2️⃣ Restrictions on Journalists and Humanitarian Agencies
Access to Tigray by foreign correspondents and humanitarian organisations was tightly controlled. Reporting by Reuters’ Africa coverage and documentation from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights country reports described restricted movement, accreditation barriers, and bureaucratic obstruction.
Independent witnesses — journalists, aid workers, investigators — were physically and administratively constrained. In conflict environments, the removal of third-party observers significantly lowers reputational risk for perpetrators.
3️⃣ Physical Blockades and Territorial Isolation
Before the African Union–brokered Pretoria Cessation of Hostilities Agreement formally ended large-scale hostilities in November 2022, road access into Tigray was limited, aid convoys were obstructed, and air transport was constrained. Territorial isolation amplified informational isolation.
Blockade conditions create a dual effect: civilians are deprived of essential goods, and external actors are deprived of verified evidence. Both effects reduce international urgency.
4️⃣ Narrative Framing and Legitimacy Engineering
The conflict was repeatedly framed as a “law enforcement operation,” a linguistic strategy that implied internal security management rather than interstate or mass atrocity dynamics. At the same time, UN investigators and human rights organisations documented Eritrean military involvement during the war. Ethiopian authorities later publicly acknowledged Eritrean troop presence in Tigray after hostilities ceased, though accountability questions remain contested.
Narrative framing influences diplomatic response thresholds. When violence is presented as counterinsurgency, anti-terrorism, or constitutional enforcement, external actors are more likely to adopt a wait-and-see posture.
🧠 The Theory: How Manufactured Invisibility Works
Manufactured invisibility operates through four reinforcing pillars:
Information Asymmetry – Restricting real-time evidence flow so that external actors lack contemporaneous verification.
Administrative Leverage – Using licensing, accreditation, and regulatory powers to mediate who can observe events.
Narrative Securitisation – Framing violence as lawful, necessary, or defensive state action.
Diplomatic Quasi-Compliance – Offering domestic accountability processes while weakening or delaying international investigative mandates.
In October 2023, the mandate of the UN International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia was not renewed following a vote at the UN Human Rights Council. As detailed in a 13 October 2023 Reuters report on the Council’s decision, the non-renewal effectively ended that specific investigative mechanism.
The lesson is structural: when investigations lapse and evidence is fragmented, accountability timelines stretch. Delayed justice often becomes diluted justice.
Manufactured invisibility therefore does not require perfect secrecy. It requires sufficient opacity to fragment international consensus.
🇹🇿 Tanzania: Structural Capacity Assessment
To assess applicability, we examine Tanzania through four dimensions: digital control capacity, media regulatory leverage, territorial conditions, and international dependency constraints.
📡 Digital and Telecom Control Capacity
Tanzania’s communications sector operates under the authority of the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority, which licenses operators and regulates spectrum use.
The Cybercrimes Act, 2015 and electronic communications legislation provide the state with legal authority to address online content, compel cooperation from service providers, and sanction misuse of digital platforms.
During the 2020 general elections, internet disruptions and social media access restrictions were documented in CIPESA’s election monitoring analysis. While not equivalent to a full blackout, the episode demonstrates precedent for temporary digital interference during politically sensitive periods.
This suggests that selective throttling, platform restriction, or data filtering are structurally possible tools within existing regulatory architecture.
📰 Media Regulation and Enforcement Precedent
The Media Services Act, 2016 establishes a regulatory framework governing licensing, accreditation, and penalties for media outlets.
Assessments by Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders have highlighted structural constraints in Tanzania’s press environment.
Enforcement precedents include the 2017 suspension of Mwanahalisi newspaper documented by the Committee to Protect Journalists. Additionally, litigation before the East African Court of Justice — notably the 2019 judgment in Media Council of Tanzania & Others v Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania — found certain provisions inconsistent with the East African Community Treaty.
These examples demonstrate that regulatory enforcement is neither theoretical nor dormant; it has been operational and legally contested.
🗺️ Territorial and Security Structure
Unlike Ethiopia during the Tigray war, Tanzania does not currently face an active territorial insurgency controlling significant geographic space. There is no comparable siege environment or interstate troop presence within national territory.
This reduces the likelihood of prolonged physical isolation scenarios. However, localized curfews, targeted security deployments, and temporary movement restrictions remain legally available under public order frameworks.
🌍 International Dependency and Reputational Cost
Tanzania maintains strong diplomatic and development ties, reflected in the European Union–Tanzania partnership framework and the World Bank country overview for Tanzania.
Development financing, trade relations, and multilateral engagement increase the reputational cost of overt nationwide shutdowns or extended siege-style measures. In contrast to wartime Ethiopia, Tanzania operates within a more stable external partnership environment.
International dependency therefore acts as a partial constraint on extreme opacity measures.
📊 Expanded Risk Matrix: Manufactured Invisibility in Tanzania
MechanismStructural CapacityPolitical CostProbability (Short-Term)Strategic ImpactSelective social media blockingHighModerateMediumMediumJournalist access restrictionsHighLow–ModerateMedium–HighMediumAdministrative pressure on NGOsModerate–HighModerateMediumMediumNationwide telecom blackoutTechnically feasibleVery HighLowHighProlonged territorial siegeLow structural basisExtremeVery LowExtreme
The most plausible mechanisms are administrative and digital — not territorial or total blackout strategies.
🔮 Scenario Outlook
Short-Term (0–12 months)
Periods of heightened political tension may see selective digital throttling, increased enforcement of cyber legislation, and securitised rhetoric emphasising stability and sovereignty. Access for journalists or observers could become more tightly managed rather than openly denied.
Medium-Term (1–3 years)
Expansion of regulatory oversight, licensing scrutiny, and administrative containment of dissent are more structurally probable than dramatic emergency-style shutdowns. Narrative framing around national unity, constitutional order, and foreign interference could intensify during contested moments.
Low-Probability / High-Impact Scenario
A nationwide communication blackout during severe unrest would likely trigger rapid diplomatic, financial, and reputational consequences. Given Tanzania’s economic integration, such a move would carry significant external cost.
🧭 Analytical Conclusion
The Ethiopian case illustrates a modern authoritarian toolkit combining information control, administrative leverage, narrative framing, and accountability delay.
Tanzania possesses partial structural capacity for selective elements of this toolkit — particularly digital regulation and media licensing mechanisms. However, it lacks key enabling conditions present in Tigray:
Active territorial civil war
Interstate troop involvement
Sustained geographic isolation
Large-scale regional fragmentation
The most plausible risk is not total invisibility.
It is gradual securitisation of information space combined with selective transparency, regulatory enforcement, and calibrated diplomatic messaging.
Manufactured invisibility rarely begins with dramatic shutdowns.
It begins with incremental narrowing of what can be seen, documented, and amplified.
