US intelligence claimed that the Houthis and al Shabaab have discussed a deal for the Houthis to provide weapons to al Shabaab. US intelligence officials told CNN on June 11 that they had not found any direct evidence of weapons transfers. US officials said any potential deal would provide needed revenue for the Houthis and more advanced weapons systems for al Shabaab while advancing both groups’ anti-US goals in the Gulf of Aden.
The two groups have indirect connections through regional illicit arms networks that would likely help facilitate indirect talks. Al Shabaab already has Iranian small arms intended for Yemen and shares mutual contacts with the Houthis through both groups’ involvement in the Gulf of Aden smuggling network. The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GITOC) wrote in a 2020 report that some weapons al Shabaab acquired from the Yemen-Somalia network come directly from Iranian shipments to Yemen meant for the Houthis. The report notes that this is more likely due to profit-seeking arms traffickers than Iran- or Houthi-sanctioned supply to al Shabaab. However, GITOC’s investigation also found that at least one Houthi official involved in the illicit network had direct contact with a Somali weapons smuggler who had imported arms to the IS affiliate that operates in the same areas as al Shabaab in northern Somalia.
Direct talks between al Shabaab and the Houthis would indicate the groups are interested in exchanging higher-grade systems not typically exchanged in the Gulf of Aden smuggling network, such as surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and attack drones. US officials indicated that the Houthis would send a “bigger kit” of weaponry than rockets and mortars. Small arms, light weapons, and surveillance drone sales pose limited returns for high risk for both al Shabaab and the Houthis.
Al Shabaab is presumably willing to risk international retaliation for working with the Houthis and potential internal criticism for cooperating with an Iran-backed Shi’ite faction only if it acquires sophisticated weapons that it does not already have access to. Similarly, the Houthis are presumably willing to risk even greater international scrutiny and internal criticism for working with an al Qaeda affiliate only if it substantially advances its goals in the region. Small arms, light weapons, and surveillance drones fall short of these expectations due to al Shabaab’s preexisting access and these weapons’ limited ability to threaten US activity in Houthi domains.
The Houthis have SAMs and attack drones that address these various interests. The Houthis began shooting down MQ-9 multipurpose US drones in 2017 by modifying Soviet-era SAM stockpiles with Iranian assistance. The group has since upgraded to Iranian-provided SAM systems, which has helped it increase its shoot-down rate since it began attacking shipping in the Red Sea after October 7, including downing three drones in late May.
The Houthis have also used Qasef series loitering munitions, which have similar Iranian versions, since 2016. The lowest-end Qasef drones have a range of 200 kilometers, and the Houthis have used them to strike Patriot air defense systems in Saudi Arabia and detonate above soft targets in southern Yemen. The drones are cheap, easy to manufacture, easily transportable, and require relatively little supporting logistics to operate, making them ideal for al Shabaab use. The Houthis also have higher-end drone series, but the Qasefs would be a significant boost to al Shabaab’s capabilities without degrading higher-end Houthi capabilities.
However, the Houthis are unlikely to send advanced weapons systems, such as anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, to al Shabaab. The Houthis would have to provide al Shabaab with substantial training and logistical assistance to enable the group to use and maintain such weapons. Such requirements would include but are not limited to training to effectively launch and maintain the systems, logistical assistance in providing and storing fuel, and launch pads. This effort would necessitate sending trainers and additional supplies to Somalia or having al Shabaab militants train in Yemen, all of which adds additional risk for both groups. The Houthis would also presumably be more reluctant to send a nascent and potentially volatile partner these more valuable and harder-to-replace systems.
Al Shabaab would likely use Houthi-provided attack drones and SAMs to target US systems and allied personnel. Al Shabaab SAMs would target the US drones that regularly monitor and strike al Shabaab militants throughout Somalia in support of the SFG. This would enable al Shabaab to degrade US and partnered intelligence collection and strike capabilities, which would strengthen al Shabaab’s freedom of movement throughout the country.
Al Shabaab would presumably use the attack drones to target Somali and allied positions throughout the country. Houthi attacks on fixed defense infrastructure and other military targets in Yemen provide a template for how al Shabaab could use this against fixed positions housing Somali or partner military forces, including African Union and US personnel. The attack drones would likely fill a similar tactical role as al Shabaab’s suicide bombers, which the group uses for similar purposes to loitering munitions. It primarily uses person-borne suicide bombers to target softer targets in government-controlled areas, while it uses suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) to breach hardened bases in infantry assaults.
The group could also use attack drones to target US ships in the Gulf of Aden. Attacking US naval assets would not directly advance al Shabaab’s military objectives in Somalia due to their noninvolvement in US support for the SFG’s fight against al Shabaab. However, such attacks would be a propaganda boost for the group. Al Shabaab views the United States as a key enemy due to its support to the SFG and other countries fighting al Shabaab. This leads it to regularly threaten the United States, and it has highly publicized the rare instances it attacks US forces in the Horn of Africa.
The two groups are unnatural partners due to their stark sectarian differences, which is a significant obstacle to significant cooperation outside the regional weapons-smuggling network. However, they still have some shared connections through the Axis of Resistance and al Qaeda networks that could help facilitate opportunistic cooperation based on their shared anti-American interests. The Houthis’ patron, Iran, and al Shabaab’s parent organization, al Qaeda, already have a well-established relationship despite being on radically opposite sides of the Shi’a-Sunni divide. Iran provided sanctuary, training, weapons, and funds to al Qaeda throughout the 1990s into the early 2000s.
Al Qaeda has more recently used Iran as a key facilitation hub and sanctuary for leadership and funds since the 2010s after a crackdown in the mid-2000s. UN member states and the FBI all report that al Qaeda’s current leader resides in Iran, highlighting their unique relationship. This transactional partnership allows Iran to maintain leverage with al Qaeda to dissuade attacks against itself or Shi’ite communities while enabling al Qaeda to better strike their shared adversary—the United States. US officials said they are exploring potential Iranian involvement in the Houthi-Shabaab arms talks but have not found any direct ties.
The Houthis have established a transactional partnership with another al Qaeda affiliate, the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The two groups have cooperated on prisoner swaps since 2015. The Telegraph reported in May 2024 that the Houthis had expanded cooperation to include limited military support and cooperation with AQAP since 2022 to weaken Emirati-backed forces in southern Yemen. Independent analysts and Emirati-backed Yemeni military officials also claim the Houthis provided AQAP with unspecified one-way attack drones in 2023 as part of this effort. AQAP also has direct ties with al Shabaab through the al Qaeda network and has historically provided al Shabaab with explosives capabilities. These relationships set a precedent for Houthi cooperation with other al Qaeda affiliates, such as al Shabaab, and highlight AQAP’s role as a potential intermediary within the al Qaeda network.
The lack of common targets that advance both groups’ local military aims is another obstacle to significant cooperation. Al Shabaab attacks on US drones in Somalia would not directly help the Houthis. US Africa Command (AFRICOM) is responsible for US operations in Somalia, whereas US Central Command (CENTCOM) heads US activity in Yemen and the Red Sea. Inversely, al Shabaab attacks on US naval systems would target CENTCOM resources, which would help the Houthis but not degrade AFRICOM’s capabilities in Somalia. US officials’ statements that the Houthis are primarily engaged in talks for revenue reasons could indicate that this tension is not a significant factor and that the Houthis do not care what al Shabaab targets, as long as the Houthis receive funds.
Al Shabaab may also be unable to safely transfer weapons shipments from northern Somalia to southern Somalia, which would limit their usefulness. Most weapons that arrive in Somalia through the Somalia-Yemen trade route arrive in northern Somalia. Al Shabaab primarily uses this area as a financial and logistics hub that supports its primary area of operations in central and southern Somalia. The group has been increasingly clashing with the IS Somali affiliate in this area, already restricting its freedom of movement and ability to support this effort. The SFG has also degraded al Shabaab’s ability to freely move supplies between central and southern Somalia since an offensive in 2022 split the group’s support zones in central and southern Somalia.



