War Without Borders: The Horn of Africa's Interconnected Crises
Ujasusi Blog’s Horn of Africa Monitoring Team | 22 September 2025 | 0100 BST
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🇸🇩 Sudan: A Nation Consumed by a Fratricidal War
Since April 2023, Sudan has descended into civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Gen. Mohamed "Hemedti" Dagalo. Once allies, the two now command rival militaries locked in urban warfare across Khartoum, Darfur, and parts of Gezira.
An estimated 12 million people are displaced, according to UN agencies.
Credible reports of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, particularly targeting the Masalit community.
Mediation attempts (Jeddah process, AU, IGAD) have not yielded a ceasefire.
Foreign involvement (according to multiple credible sources): UAE is alleged to have supported the RSF with arms and logistics via Chad, though Abu Dhabi denies the claims. Egypt and Iran have supported the SAF. Russian-linked military contractors—possibly affiliated with what is now referred to as Africa Corps—are also reported to have aided the RSF. Turkey and Qatar have aligned with the SAF.
🔗 The conflict is fragmenting Sudan. With persistent foreign involvement and entrenched positions, the war shows no clear end in sight.
🇸🇸 South Sudan: Peace Agreement Fraying at the Seams
The 2018 peace agreement between President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar has stalled. Elections scheduled for 2024 were postponed to 2026.
Early 2025 saw intensified clashes in Upper Nile and Machar-aligned areas.
Vice President Machar was reportedly placed under tight security control following these clashes.
Ugandan troops deployed to Juba to bolster security.
Oil export revenues—South Sudan's financial lifeline—have been severely disrupted due to pipeline impacts from Sudan’s conflict.
🚨 The UN has warned of a deteriorating security situation that could trigger renewed civil war if tensions persist.
🇪🇹 Ethiopia & 🇪🇷 Eritrea: Cold Peace at Boiling Point
Ethiopia and Eritrea have seen rising tensions despite the 2018 peace deal. The fallout from the Tigray war (2020–2022) remains unresolved:
Eritrean forces have not fully withdrawn from Tigray, with presence reported in border zones.
2025 saw a spike in accusations: Eritrean President Isaias accused Ethiopia of rearming for war; Ethiopia accused Eritrea of territorial occupation and collusion with Tigrayan hardliners.
Credible sources report Eritrea may be backing splinter groups in Tigray and other actors inside Ethiopia, although direct proof remains limited. The potential for miscalculation is high, but outright war has not resumed.
🇸🇴 Somalia: Al-Shabaab Remains Entrenched
Somalia continues its protracted war against Al-Shabaab, one of Al-Qaeda’s most resilient affiliates:
2022–2023: Somali government offensives—supported by clan militias—liberated parts of central Somalia.
Al-Shabaab responded with high-profile attacks, including on AU bases (e.g., 54 Ugandan soldiers killed in Bulo Marer).
The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is expected to fully withdraw by end of 2024.
The U.S. has redeployed special forces and conducted airstrikes. Turkey and the UAE continue training and equipping Somali forces.
🎯 Al-Shabaab remains active across southern and central Somalia, with periodic cross-border attacks into Kenya and Ethiopia.
🌐 Regional Interlinkages: The Web of Crisis
The conflicts are interconnected and mutually reinforcing:
Sudan’s war has displaced over a million people into South Sudan, Chad, Egypt, and Ethiopia.
Arms flows and proxy dynamics link Sudan with both Ethiopia and Eritrea—each with its own interests in the war’s outcome.
Egypt and Sudan (SAF) have aligned diplomatically against Ethiopia over the Nile waters dispute and the GERD project.
Somalia’s instability directly affects Kenya and Ethiopia, both of which have engaged in counterterrorism campaigns inside Somalia.
📉 Borders are porous; arms trafficking and militant movement further undermine regional stability.
🛰 Intelligence and Security Trends
🔫 Arms Flows
Iranian drones (e.g., Mohajer-6) are reported to have been delivered to Sudan’s SAF.
UAE has been accused of sending arms to the RSF via Chad. These reports are credible but remain contested; UAE denies the claims.
Russian and Chinese weapons remain present in Sudan and Ethiopia, though delivery routes are opaque.
🕵️ Proxies & Mercenaries
Russian military contractors—previously affiliated with Wagner and now possibly operating under the Africa Corps umbrella—are reported to support RSF, particularly in securing gold exports.
Ukraine has acknowledged limited technical support to the SAF, citing Wagner involvement as justification.
Eritrea is suspected of backing anti-TPLF elements inside Tigray, though no direct admissions have been made.
📲 Disinformation & Narrative Warfare
SAF and RSF have each engaged in coordinated disinformation campaigns, including AI-generated deepfakes and targeted hate speech.
Similar information warfare tactics have been observed in Ethiopia and Somalia.
🌍 Border Insecurity
The Darfur–Chad, South Sudan–Ethiopia, and Somalia–Kenya corridors are key conduits for weapons, fighters, and refugees.
Security forces across the region struggle to contain cross-border insurgent movement.
🍽 Humanitarian Fallout
The UN estimates that over 25 million people in Sudan require humanitarian assistance.
Parts of Darfur and South Sudan are experiencing emergency-level food insecurity.
Cholera and measles outbreaks have been reported in overcrowded refugee camps.
🧭 Strategic Outlook
⏱ Short-Term (Now–Late 2025)
Sudan: Fighting continues; no peace deal likely this year.
South Sudan: Tensions remain high; political violence may intensify.
Somalia: Al-Shabaab likely to escalate attacks as ATMIS drawdown continues.
Ethiopia–Eritrea: Rhetoric sharpens; border incidents possible.
📆 Medium-Term (Late 2025–2026)
Sudan risks long-term fragmentation.
South Sudan elections may be delayed again amid insecurity.
Al-Shabaab could reclaim liberated zones without stronger Somali forces.
Eritrea may intensify covert actions in Ethiopia if tensions worsen.
🧨 Long-Term (2026+)
Region evolves into a multi-conflict security complex, drawing in major powers.
Potential for large-scale displacement crises and proxy confrontation.
Red Sea geopolitics and Nile water disputes add strategic layers to existing conflicts.
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