[FREE ACCESS] The Silent Fronts: Analysing the Decline of Key Islamic State Affiliates
Why Some Islamic State Affiliates Have Gone Silent: An Analysis of “Repressed” Branches
Ujasusi Blog Terrorism Monitor Desk | 29 November 2025 | 0030 GMT
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Over a decade has passed since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of a caliphate from the pulpit of Mosul’s al-Nuri mosque. This act ushered in an era of unprecedented expansion for the Islamic State (IS), drawing in affiliates from across the globe. Yet, while groups like Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) remain potent threats, a significant number of the group’s branches have seen their operational capabilities drastically decline or disappear entirely.
A recent analysis in the CTC Sentinel categorises these as “repressed” affiliates—groups formally recognised by IS central leadership but which have not claimed a successful attack in over a year, according to the group’s own propaganda. The stories of these affiliates in Algeria, the Caucasus, India, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sinai, and Yemen reveal a complex tapestry of counterterrorism successes, local dynamics, and strategic shifts within the global jihadist movement.
Defining the “Repressed” Affiliate
Identifying a “failed” terrorist group is notoriously difficult. Clandestine organisations can strategically go quiet to regroup, and a lack of visible attacks does not necessarily mean a lack of capability. To navigate this, researchers used a specific metric: an analysis of the Islamic State’s weekly newsletter, Al Naba.
Affiliates that had not claimed an attack in Al Naba for at least 12 months before August 2025 were classified as “repressed.” This term intentionally avoids a sense of finality, acknowledging that these groups may be dormant rather than dead.
The “repressed” affiliates identified through this method are:
Algeria: Last claimed attack – February 2020
Caucasus: Last claimed attack – December 2020
Saudi Arabia (Hijaz & Najd): Last claimed attacks – November 2020 & April 2019
India: Last claimed attack – July 2022
Libya: Last claimed attack – April 2022
Sinai: Last claimed attack – January 2023
Yemen: Last claimed attack – July 2022
Case Studies in Decline: A Multi-Faceted Story
The reasons behind each affiliate’s decline are unique, yet several common themes emerge.
1. Relentless and Adaptive Counterterrorism Pressure
In several cases, sustained military and law enforcement action has been the primary driver of repression.
Saudi Arabia: The kingdom employed an aggressive, multi-pronged strategy. This included widespread arrests—detaining hundreds of suspects in single operations—combined with sophisticated counter-extremism programs. Initiatives like the Global Centre for Combating Extremist Ideology worked to undermine the IS narrative, while government-aligned religious leaders publicly denounced the group. This comprehensive approach appears to have effectively dismantled the formal operational presence of IS within the country’s borders.
Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula: The campaign against IS-Sinai demonstrates the importance of adaptive tactics. Initial reliance on large-scale military force made little headway. Success came only after Egyptian authorities shifted to partnering with local tribes, integrating them into the counterinsurgency effort. This localised approach, combining amnesty offers with targeted force, ultimately degraded the affiliate, leading the government to declare victory in the region by early 2023.
India: While the “Islamic State in India” has claimed a few attacks, Indian security forces maintain intense pressure. Consistent arrests of individuals and cells—often in advanced stages of attack planning—suggest that proactive law enforcement and intelligence operations have prevented the affiliate from establishing a durable operational footprint.
2. The Shadow of Powerful Rivals and Overlapping Agendas
In conflict zones, competition from other militant actors can be as damaging as state-led counterterrorism.
Yemen: The IS affiliate there has had to contend not only with a civil war but also with fierce competition from the much larger and more entrenched Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The two groups engaged in open conflict, with AQAP even placing a bounty on the IS leader’s head. Furthermore, the Houthis have conducted their own counterterrorism operations that have significantly attrited IS fighters.
Caucasus & India: The dramatic rise of ISK has potentially overshadowed or even absorbed the responsibilities of neighbouring affiliates. ISK has demonstrated both the capability and intent to operate in Russia and has been linked to recruitment efforts in the North Caucasus and India. This raises the possibility that the “Caucasus” and “India” affiliates have been functionally supplanted by the more robust and ambitious ISK.
3. Local Context and Historical Baggage
A failure to resonate with local populations has proven fatal for some IS branches.
Algeria: The country’s “Black Decade” of civil war in the 1990s, which cost an estimated 150,000 lives, left a deep-seated public aversion to political violence. This historical context, combined with robust Algerian border security and deradicalisation programs, created an environment where IS ideology found little fertile ground for growth.
Libya: While the affiliate once controlled the city of Sirte, its brutal governance—documented by human rights groups—created a lasting stigma. This reputation for extreme violence made it difficult for the group to form alliances with other local militias, limiting its long-term resilience even amid Libya’s political chaos.
Key Takeaways for Global Counterterrorism
The analysis of these repressed affiliates yields several critical insights for security practitioners and policymakers:
No One-Size-Fits-All Solution: Effective counterterrorism requires nuanced, localised strategies. What worked in the Sinai (partnering with tribes) is different from what worked in Saudi Arabia (ideological and law enforcement pressure).
“Hard Power” is Necessary but Not Sufficient: Military and law enforcement action is crucial for disrupting plots and degrading capabilities. However, its application must be flexible and often works best when integrated with local partners.
The Central Core’s Decline Had a Ripple Effect: The territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISC) diminished its ability to provide resources, funding, and strategic guidance to its global network, weakening its farthest-flung branches.
The Threat is Suppressed, Not Eliminated: Declaring these affiliates “defeated” would be premature. Many may have shifted to lower-profile activities like recruitment, fundraising, and logistics. The underlying ideological appeal often remains, and a change in local conditions could provide an opportunity for resurgence.
Cautious Note of Optimism
The phenomenon of “repressed” Islamic State affiliates offers a cautious note of optimism in the long-term fight against terrorism. It demonstrates that sustained, intelligent counterterrorism efforts can effectively degrade even determined terrorist networks. However, it also serves as a stark warning against complacency. The silence from these branches is not necessarily a sign of surrender, but often a strategic pause. Understanding the complex reasons behind their decline is essential for preventing their future resurgence and for crafting policies that can effectively counter the affiliates that remain active and deadly.