[FREE ACCESS] Ujasusi Blog's Africa Terrorism Monitor: Tracker Update Oct 12 - Nov 15, 2025
Ujasusi Blog Terrorism Monitoring Desk | 18 November 2025 | 2135 GMT
Geographic Focus: Africa (Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Horn of Africa, Great Lakes, Southern Africa, Sudan) with Global Terrorism Context (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria–Iraq, Yemen, Far-Right Extremism)
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This report consolidates open-source intelligence (OSINT) on terrorism, insurgency, and politically motivated violence across Africa and selected global hotspots during the period 12 October to 15 November 2025. It integrates incident-level data, trend analysis, and strategic assessments to support policymakers, security practitioners, and researchers.
Executive Summary – Key Findings
Major Incidents Across All Regions
The 35-day reporting period witnessed a high tempo of terrorist activity and political instability across Africa, with critical flashpoints in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado, and Sudan’s civil war. Globally, counterterrorism operations against jihadist networks in Pakistan and residual ISIS structures in Syria–Iraq continued, while far-right extremism in the United States and Europe remained a significant, evolving threat primarily reflected in prosecutions and arrests.
Total Casualties (Preliminary)
Africa (Terrorism & Counterterrorism): Estimated 660–690+ killed in terrorist attacks, inter-jihadist fighting, and counterterrorism operations.
Global Hotspots (CT Operations): At least 15+ terrorist operatives eliminated, primarily in Pakistan and Somalia.
Far-Right Extremism: Multiple arrests and one major prosecution (US neo-Nazi leader guilty plea in New York).
Political Violence (Non-Terrorism, High Impact): Approximately 148–2,055+ killed in electoral and state violence in Tanzania and Cameroon (wide variance reflects severe verification challenges), plus more than 2,000 killed in Sudan in a single week, representing the deadliest phase since April 2023.
The period was characterised by jihadist territorial expansion (notably JNIM into Nigeria and ISSP into urban Niger), intensified inter-jihadist rivalry (ISWAP vs Boko Haram), widespread targeting of civilians (especially in DRC and Mali), and severe governance crises offering exploitable openings for extremist actors, particularly in Tanzania and Cameroon.
Africa – Detailed Regional Analysis
Sahel Region – Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
Mali – JNIM Siege and Government Crisis
Key Development: Mali stands on the brink of systemic collapse as Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) combines kinetic operations with economic warfare, notably fuel supply strangulation targeting Bamako.
Major Incidents
2 October 2025 – Kamona Village Massacre (Segou Region)
Perpetrators: Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and allied Dozo militias. Casualties: At least 21 civilians killed, 10 homes burned. Method: Summary executions; villagers accused of collaborating with JNIM. Source: Human Rights Watch, 17 November 2025.
13 October 2025 – Balle Village Attack (Segou Region)
Perpetrators: FAMa and Dozo militias. Casualties: 10 civilians killed (including 1 woman). Context: Framed as counterterrorism operations targeting JNIM influence. Source: Human Rights Watch.
23 October 2025 – Markala Massacre (Segou Cercle)
Perpetrators: Joint FAMa–Dozo operations. Casualties: Over 30 cattle owners killed. Source: ACLED, November 2025.
JNIM Operations and Strategic Posture
Fuel Blockade: Ongoing since September 2025, aimed at choking fuel supplies to Bamako and paralysing economic activity.
High-Value Ransom: JNIM reportedly received USD 50–70 million for the release of two Emirati hostages kidnapped in September 2025, significantly boosting its financial capacity.
Kidnappings: Two Egyptian nationals were abducted on the Segou–Bamako road on 30 October 2025.
Territorial Control: JNIM maintains control over large rural swaths of central and northern Mali, enforcing sharia-based governance structures.
First Attack in Nigeria: 28 October 2025, Nuku (Kwara State) – one Nigerian soldier killed, weapons and cash seized, marking JNIM’s first acknowledged attack inside Nigeria.
Strategic Assessment – Mali
International Evacuations: At least 12 countries (including the US, Germany, Japan, and the UK) have advised their citizens to leave Mali due to escalating insecurity and the fuel blockade.
Economic Warfare: JNIM’s blockade demonstrates the Malian government’s inability to guarantee essential services, eroding state legitimacy.
Force Strength: JNIM’s combined Sahelian force is estimated at approximately 6,000 fighters.
External Support to Government: The junta increasingly relies on Russian “Africa Corps” mercenaries for offensive operations, a strategy associated with high civilian casualty rates and limited durable gains.
Risk Trajectory: Without political settlement and improved governance, Mali faces a realistic risk of further state fragmentation, with Bamako’s security under mounting pressure.
Burkina Faso
In October 2025, 11 terrorist attacks were recorded across West Africa/Sahel, with Burkina Faso as a critical hotspot, according to the Al-Azhar Observatory.
Reference to May 2025: A JNIM attack in Djibo reportedly killed around 200 soldiers, underscoring Burkina’s extreme vulnerability. Current dynamics involve sustained operations by both JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), with competition for territorial influence and recruitment. Source: Al-Azhar Observatory for Combating Extremism.
Niger
ISSP Urban Expansion
21 October 2025 – Niamey Kidnapping
Incident: US citizen missionary abducted in the capital Niamey. Significance: Indicates ISSP’s ability and intent to operate in urban centers, not just peripheral border areas.
18 October 2025 – Bagaroua Attack (Tahoua Region)
Perpetrator: ISSP militants. Casualties: At least 2 security personnel killed.
Targets: Security force positions and administrative sites.
JNIM Expansion in Niger
Throughout October 2025, JNIM conducted small-scale attacks and improvised explosive device (IED) operations in Tanda commune, Dosso region. Telecommunications and municipal infrastructure were destroyed in Fabidji and Belande, degrading local governance. JNIM released a video urging Ahlus Sunnah clerics to join jihad, signalling an ideological and recruitment push.
Lake Chad Basin – Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad
Nigeria – ISWAP and Boko Haram
Major Incidents
10 November 2025 – ISWAP vs Boko Haram Turf War
Location: Dogon Chiku village, shores of Lake Chad.
Casualties: Approximately 200 terrorists killed in intra-jihadist fighting (ISWAP reportedly suffered heavier losses).
Details: Boko Haram seized several boats and equipment from ISWAP.
Context: Latest major clash in the rivalry that followed the 2016 split within Boko Haram.
14–17 November 2025 – Capture and Execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba
Officer Profile:
Full Name: Brigadier General Musa Uba
Position: Commander, 25 Task Force Brigade, Damboa
Born: 27 January 1978
Commissioned: Nigerian Army, 2001
Promoted to Brigadier General: October 2024 Reputation: Calm, steady, fearless commander known for never allowing rank to distance him from his troops
Timeline of Incident:
Friday, 14 November 2025 (Night): ISWAP fighters ambushed a Nigerian military convoy on the Damboa–Biu road near Wajiroko, Borno State, along the Burum–Kubua axis
Location: Area bordering Sambisa Forest, with dense forests on both sides—a known ISWAP crossing route
Immediate Casualties: 2 soldiers and 2 Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members killed
Seized Equipment: At least 17 military motorcycles
Context: Brig. Gen. Uba had moved out with only 28 soldiers—barely a platoon-sized force, far below the minimum protection required for a Brigade Commander
Terrain Challenge: A destroyed bridge forced movement onto footpaths; Brig. Gen. Uba crossed on a motorcycle
Saturday, 15 November 2025 (Initial Response): Nigerian Army spokesperson Lt.-Col. Appolonia Anele issued a statement denying the abduction Statement claimed: “The general successfully led troops back to base” and “courageously fought through the insurgents’ ambush with superior firepower”
Reality: Brig. Gen. Uba had survived the initial contact and taken cover in dense forest
Saturday–Sunday, 15–16 November 2025 (Attempted Rescue): Brig. Gen. Uba established communication with the Theatre Command via WhatsApp video call. He confirmed he was alive and transmitted his GPS location.
Final Communications (via WhatsApp, as reported by Sahara Reporters): “Are they going to pick me or direct me on where to go?” “My battery is 31% now” “Sir, I am on foot, but once I see the aircraft, I can raise my peak cap”
Theatre Commander Major General Abubakar personally led rescue operations.
Ground troops and Nigerian Air Force aircraft were deployed.
The Rescue operation lasted approximately 24 hours
Critical Intelligence Failure: ISWAP “left his mobile phone on long enough for the military to get his coordinates,” then switched it off after making him participate in a video call with a friend.
Intelligence source: “Rescue team mobilised to the location but could not find him”
Analysis: Viral social media reports of his abduction may have inadvertently alerted ISWAP to rescue efforts, illustrating a recurring challenge in conflict reporting: how information can endanger personnel and inadvertently assist hostile groups
Monday, 17 November 2025: ISWAP claimed via the Amaq propaganda channel that a Brigadier was killed. Gen. Uba had been captured and executed
Evidence: ISWAP released photographs showing the general in uniform and during capture, with a gunshot wound to the leg.
Verification: HumAngle obtained and verified imagery through detailed frame analysis, geolocation cross-checking, and independent security source confirmation
Method of Execution: Brief interrogation followed by summary execution
Strategic Significance:
Highest-ranking Nigerian officer killed since Brigadier General Dzarma Zirkushi (28 Task Force Brigade Commander) was killed by ISWAP on 13 November 2021—exactly four years and one day earlier.
Both commanders operated in adjacent border zones and died in eerily similar circumstances.
Brigadier General Zirkushi was killed alongside seven soldiers; Brig. Gen. Uba died with 4 soldiers and 2 CJTF members. In 2025, ISWAP overran military positions on at least 15 occasions, killing soldiers and seizing weapons.
Positions overrun include: Gajibo, Buni Gari, Marte, Izge, Rann, Nigeria–Cameroon joint base at Wulgo/Soueram, Malam Fatori, Goniri, Sabon Gari, Wajiroko, and Monguno.
New appointment: Brigadier General Mustapha designated as replacement commander
Operational Lessons: The general’s mobile communications, while necessary for coordination, may have provided ISWAP with operational intelligence. The movement of a Brigade Commander with only platoon-strength protection demonstrates severe resource constraints. Terrain challenges (destroyed bridges, dense forest, motorcycle-only access) compound vulnerability
28 October 2025 – JNIM’s First Attack in Nigeria
Date of Attack: 28 October 2025
Date of Claim: 31 October 2025 (via JNIM Telegram channel)
Location: Nuku, Kwara State (north-central Nigeria).
Casualties: 1 soldier killed.
Seizures: One AK rifle, six mobile phones, ammunition, one motorcycle, assorted military gear, and cash in Nigerian naira.
Significance: Marks JNIM’s initial operational footprint inside Nigeria, raising concerns about an al-Qaeda–aligned presence beyond the Sahel.
Context: Security analysts note that JNIM had been hinting at a Nigerian presence for months, with some “Lakurawa” activity along the Benin border assessed as JNIM operations. The choice of Kwara State is strategically significant given its central location and proximity to the Federal Capital Territory (approximately 300 km from Abuja). JNIM operates from Kainji National Park, where it maintains operational collaboration with Ansaru terrorists through cross-border movements. In June 2025, JNIM claimed an attack on Basso, Benin, approximately 15 kilometres from communities around Kainji National Park.
Strategic Context – Nigeria
Nigeria is ranked 6th on the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. More than a decade of conflict has resulted in tens of thousands killed and over 2 million people displaced, primarily in the northeast. On 24 October 2025, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu appointed new service chiefs in an effort to revitalise the counterinsurgency strategy. JNIM’s estimated 6,000 fighters and ISWAP’s resilience highlight the challenge of containing multiple jihadist actors simultaneously.
Cameroon – Post-Election Violence (Security Vulnerability) Note: While primarily a case of state and political violence rather than terrorism, the chaotic environment creates exploitable gaps for extremist groups.
27 October – November 2025 – Electoral Violence Election Context: Presidential election held 12 October 2025; 92-year-old President Paul Biya was declared re-elected with 53.66% of the vote according to official results.
Opposition Response: Opposition leader Issa Tchiroma Bakary claimed victory and alleged widespread fraud, prompting protests.
Casualties: At least 48–55 people killed by security forces per UN and opposition estimates.
Methods: Use of live ammunition, severe beatings by police and gendarmes against protesters and bystanders.
Arrests: “Several hundred” to up to 2,000 people detained, including minors.
Lockdown Measures: A “dead cities” protest campaign ran from 4–7 November, during which urban life was largely paralysed.
Charges: Detainees faced accusations including “hostility against the homeland,” “revolution,” and “rebellion,” some of which carry the death penalty.
Torture Concerns: At least 6 detainees were held at the State Defence Secretariat, a site with a documented history of torture.
The militarised response to post-electoral protests risks deepening grievances in already restive regions and may create permissive conditions for both jihadist and separatist actors to expand recruitment and operations.
Horn of Africa – Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia
Somalia – Al-Shabaab
Major Incidents
4 October 2025 – Godka Jilicow Prison Attack (Mogadishu)
Location: Near the presidential palace in Mogadishu.
Perpetrators: Approximately 7 Al-Shabaab militants disguised as security officers.
Method: A car bomb detonated at the facility, followed by a coordinated assault with small arms and secondary explosions.
Duration: Six-hour siege. Outcome: All 7 attackers were killed; several prisoners briefly escaped but many were later recaptured.
Casualties: An unspecified number of security personnel were killed.
Context: The attack followed the government’s decision to remove many security checkpoints and reopen more than 50 roads in Mogadishu—a confidence-building measure intended to demonstrate improved security and facilitate commerce. The timing deliberately targeted this new security posture, demonstrating Al-Shabaab’s ability to exploit reduced checkpoint coverage.
Significance: This was the third Al-Shabaab prison attack in 2025, reflecting sustained operational focus on: (1) liberating detained fighters, (2) demonstrating state weakness in securing high-value facilities, (3) undermining government authority over the justice system, and (4) recruiting from the prisoner population. The targeted prison’s location near the presidential palace was strategically significant, demonstrating Al-Shabaab’s capability to conduct complex operations in Mogadishu’s most heavily secured zone.
Government Gains: In early October, Somali and Ugandan forces recaptured the strategic town of Awdheegle (Lower Shabelle, roughly 80 km from Mogadishu).
Counterterrorism Operations in Somalia
Between February and November 2025, Somali authorities reported 868 Al-Shabaab militants killed in airstrikes, according to the Defence Minister. Three senior Al-Shabaab terrorists were reportedly killed in operations within the 12 October–15 November period (specific dates not publicly detailed). US Africa Command (AFRICOM) conducted multiple airstrikes against Al-Shabaab targets, including strikes approximately 55 km northeast of Kismayo.
Kenya
27 October 2025 – Thwarted Al-Shabaab Attack (Garissa County)
Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) disrupted an Al-Shabaab-linked plot in Garissa County. Eight suspects were detained and are under investigation for planning cross-border attacks originating from Somalia. Source: Dawan Africa.
Kenya remains a key frontline state against Al-Shabaab, with periodic cross-border incursions and plots targeting security forces and civilian infrastructure, especially in the northern and coastal regions.
Great Lakes, Southern Africa, and Sudan
Democratic Republic of Congo – Eastern Provinces (ADF/ISIS-DRC)
Major Incident: Byambwe Hospital Massacre
Dates: 14–15 November 2025
Location: Byambwe Reference Health Centre, Lubero territory, North Kivu Province.
Perpetrators: Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels, operating as an affiliate of ISIS in the region (ISIS-DRC/ISCAP).
Casualties: Between 20 and 29 people killed, including patients and breastfeeding mothers.
Method: Brutal attack on the maternity ward; reports indicate victims had their throats slit, with mothers killed while breastfeeding.
Target Profile: Catholic hospital in a predominantly Christian area, consistent with ADF/ISIS-DRC’s pattern of targeting Christian communities.
Strategic Assessment – Eastern DRC
The ADF operates under the banner of the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), sustaining a campaign of massacres against civilians, particularly Christians. Eastern DRC remains a highly unstable conflict complex, with overlapping armed groups and limited state presence. While Rwanda–DRC détente may mitigate the scale of interstate confrontation, it has not resolved localised insecurity or the ADF threat.
Mozambique – Cabo Delgado (ISIS-Mozambique)
ISIS-Mozambique Operations
In November 2025, the ISIS affiliate in Mozambique claimed responsibility for killing Christians, including reported beheadings in Cabo Delgado Province. The insurgency, active since 2017, has repeatedly targeted Christian communities, local security forces, and strategic economic sites. On 17 November 2025, a criminal complaint was filed in France against TotalEnergies, alleging complicity in war crimes, torture, and enforced disappearance linked to its gas operations in northern Mozambique. The humanitarian crisis continues, with large-scale displacement and severe protection risks for civilians.
Sudan – RSF Atrocities (Non-Terrorism, High Casualty Political Violence) While not classified as terrorism, the scale and brutality of violence in Sudan’s civil war, particularly by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), are critical for regional security analysis and potential extremist exploitation.
25–26 October 2025 – Fall of El Fasher: RSF forces seized El Fasher after the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) withdrew, eliminating SAF’s last stronghold in Darfur.
Strategic Significance: El Fasher had been under siege since May 2024 (6 months); home to approximately 1.8 million people (pre-siege population, including IDPs). RSF capture represents a complete loss of SAF presence in Darfur and opens supply routes for RSF from Chad and Libya.
Casualties: An estimated 1,300 people were killed in the first few days following the city’s capture.
Saudi Hospital Massacre: At least 460 patients were reportedly killed by RSF militants inside the hospital.
25 October 2025 – Bara Recapture
Location: Bara, North Kordofan, a critical junction on supply routes between El Obeid and Khartoum.
Strategic Significance: Control enables RSF to interdict supplies to remaining SAF positions; part of the RSF strategy to encircle El Obeid, capital of North Kordofan.
Casualties: Up to 300 civilians killed, including five Red Crescent volunteers.
Displacement: Around 2,000 people fled to El Obeid.
Overall Week (26 October – 1 November): Over 2,000 people were killed across Sudan, making it the deadliest week since the conflict began in April 2023. This represents a turning point in conflict momentum, decisively favouring RSF, with multiple simultaneous offensives across Sudan.
The scale of atrocities and institutional collapse in Sudan has long-term implications for cross-border arms flows, refugee movements, and potential militant recruitment across the Sahel and Horn of Africa.
Global Hotspots – Jihadist Activity Outside Africa
Afghanistan – ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K):
During the specific 12 October–15 November period, publicly available granular incident data on ISIS-K activity is limited, though the group remains operational and hostile to Taliban authorities.
Historic Context: ISIS-K emerged in 2015 and has repeatedly targeted civilians and minorities, including Shia communities, schools, and public gatherings.
Child Recruitment: Documented cases show ISIS-K using children as young as 13 for attacks and support roles.
Threat Assessment: Despite pressure from the Taliban and regional actors, ISIS-K retains the capacity for high-casualty attacks within Afghanistan and potential external plotting.
Intelligence Gap: More precise attack data for this reporting period is required to fully assess operational tempo.
Pakistan – Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS-K
Major Counterterrorism Operations
15–16 November 2025 – Intelligence-Based Operations (IBOs) Casualties: 15 terrorists killed, linked to TTP/Fitna Al-Khawarij.
Locations: Dera Ismail Khan and Datta Khel (North Waziristan). High-Value Target: Alam Mehsud, a ring leader, was killed.
Outcome: Weapons and ammunition recovered from the militants.
Context: Part of Pakistan’s “Azm-e-Istehkam” (Resolve for Stability) nationwide counterterrorism framework.
October 2025 – Intensified Security Operations Casualties: 355 insurgents killed in one month, reportedly the highest monthly total in a decade.
Note: These figures represent government claims and should be assessed in the context of Pakistan’s historical reporting patterns.
Significance: Reflects an aggressive escalation in kinetic counterterrorism operations.
November 2025 – ISIS-K Commander Eliminated Target: Burhan (alias “Zaid”), a senior ISIS-K commander. Location: Patak district, Pakistan.
Method: Targeted killing by armed individuals.
Significance: A key figure in ISIS-Khorasan’s structure; US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad hailed the killing as a “key step,” though Pakistan publicly denied some external involvement.
Additional Context – Pakistan
TTP attacks increased in frequency and lethality following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, exploiting safe havens across the border. Pakistan’s authorities report disrupting at least 15 ISIS-K online recruitment networks between 2023 and 2025, highlighting the digital dimension of contemporary terrorism. Afghanistan–Pakistan border tensions remain high, with cross-border fire, militant movements, and competing narratives regarding sanctuaries.
Syria and Iraq – ISIS Remnants
Operational activity by ISIS cells in Syria–Iraq remained at a relatively low but persistent level during the period, focused on small-scale attacks, assassinations, and intimidation campaigns. On 12 November 2025, Syria’s new government signaled its intention to join the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, marking a shift in regional security alignment. US Central Command (CENTCOM) continued targeted operations aimed at degrading ISIS leadership and logistics in Syria. Assessment: ISIS remains unable to regenerate extensive territorial control but retains the capacity for sporadic attacks and insurgent activity.
Yemen – Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Direct AQAP operations recorded in open sources for this specific period are limited; however, the group continues to maintain a presence in southern Yemen. The broader security picture in Yemen is dominated by the Houthi–Saudi-led coalition conflict and regional tensions linked to the Israel–Palestine theatre. A reference from October 2025 notes nine people killed as Yemeni forces repelled an Al-Qaeda attack, though precise dates and location details are incomplete. Assessment: AQAP remains a latent threat but is currently overshadowed by civil war dynamics and other actors. Source: Arab News.
Far-Right Extremism – United States and Europe
United States
Major Prosecutions
18 November 2025 – Neo-Nazi Leader Guilty Plea
Defendant: Leader of a neo-Nazi white supremacist group.
Charges: Soliciting hate crimes and transmitting instructions for a New Year’s Eve attack plot in New York City.
Context: The defendant had been extradited from Moldova to the Eastern District of New York in May 2025.
Significance: Demonstrates the US Department of Justice’s focus on far-right terrorism and transnational extremist networks.
Analytical Assessments
October 2025 – Far-Right Violence Analysis A report titled “Analysis of Far-Right Violence Extremism – October 2025” concluded there is an “alarming presence of terrorism and extremism linked to extreme right-wing ideologies.” The report also highlighted controversy surrounding a US Homeland Security video that employed a white supremacist meme in a deportation campaign.
2025 Trend Analysis – Political Violence Studies show that white nationalism and far-right ideology are key drivers of tolerance for political violence in the US. Data indicate that political violence is disproportionately associated with right-wing extremism, particularly white supremacist networks. Multiple investigations into far-right plots and online networks are ongoing.
Europe – Germany and Other States
Germany – Major Arrests and Outstanding Threats
11 November 2025 – Darknet Assassination Platform Case
Suspect: Martin S., a 49-year-old German-Polish national.
Location: Arrested in Dortmund.
Charges: Operating a darknet platform soliciting the assassination of politicians, offering cryptocurrency bounties for successful killings.
Platform Mechanics: Used encrypted darknet infrastructure; offered cryptocurrency payments for completed assassinations; represented the evolution of far-right terrorism toward decentralised, incentive-based political violence.
Alleged Targets: Former chancellors Angela Merkel and Olaf Scholz were reportedly included on a hit list. Ideology: The suspect is alleged to have neo-Nazi links.
Significance: Demonstrates far-right terrorism’s evolution toward cryptocurrency-funded, darknet-facilitated assassination markets; parallels similar platforms identified in US investigations.
November 2025 – Neo-Nazis at Large According to German data, 714 neo-Nazis with active arrest warrants remain at large, including 115 suspects believed to be abroad. This indicates a significant enforcement challenge and a substantial residual extremist milieu within and beyond German territory.
Other European Developments
On 14 November 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio designated Antifa Ost and three other violent Antifa groups (left-wing) as terrorist organisations, sparking intense debate about symmetry in terrorism designations between far-left and far-right actors. Hungary previously designated Antifa Ost a terrorist organisation on 26 September 2025. The broader context reveals contentious political framing of extremism and competing narratives about right-versus left-wing threats.
Overall, far-right extremism remains a transnational challenge, with darknet platforms, cryptocurrency-based financing, and online radicalisation playing major roles in sustaining networks and facilitating plots.
Security Vulnerabilities and Exploitation Opportunities
Tanzania Crisis – Major Security Breakdown
29 October – 3 November 2025 – Post-Election Violence
Background
Election Date: 29 October 2025.
Official Result: President Samia Suluhu Hassan declared the winner with 97.66% of the vote, announced on 1 November.
Swearing-In: Ceremony held on 3 November 2025, closed to the general public at a military parade ground in Dodoma (instead of a stadium as in previous years).
Opposition Response: The Chadema party called for non-participation in the vote and alleged widespread fraud.
Violence and Casualties
Death Toll Estimates and Verification Status:
Official Government Position: Foreign Minister Mahmoud Thabit Kombo (1 November): “Currently, no excessive force has been used. I’ve not seen these 700 anywhere… There’s no number until now of any protesters killed.” No official government casualty figures provided as of 15 November.
Government narrative: Blamed “foreigners” and “illegal immigrants” for inciting protests.
UN and International Organisations:
UN OHCHR (31 October): “At least 10 people were killed” in Dar es Salaam, Shinyanga, and Morogoro (based on credible reports).
UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk (11 November): “Information obtained by the UN Human Rights Office from different sources in Tanzania suggests hundreds of protesters and other people were killed and an unknown number injured or detained.”
Caveat: “The Office has been unable to independently verify the casualty figures owing to the volatile security situation and the Internet shutdown.”
Amnesty International: Information about “at least 100 people being killed” (as of 31 October).
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1 November): If hundreds killed, “would constitute very grave violations of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”
Opposition Chadema Party Estimates (Methodology: Network of party members visiting hospitals and health clinics): 31 October: “Around 700” deaths nationwide (Dar es Salaam: ~350 deaths; Mwanza: 200+ deaths; distributed across 8 of Tanzania’s 31 regions). 2 November: 1,000–2,000 deaths documented. Statement by Communications Director Brenda Rupia: “Most bodies are still at the hospitals, and the police are stopping people from taking dead bodies away. The police have thrown away over 400 bodies. We don’t even know where they’ve taken them.” Methodology described by John Kitoka (Chadema spokesperson): “Chadema’s numbers had been gathered by a network of party members going to hospitals and health clinics and counting dead bodies.” Chadema claims included more than 100 party members among the dead.
Human Rights Watch Assessment: John Kitoka (Chadema director of foreign and diaspora affairs) reported to HRW: “up to 1,000 people killed by police and unidentified security force personnel in the aftermath of the elections in eight of Tanzania’s 31 regions.” HRW statement: “Human Rights Watch has not been able to confirm these numbers but regional and international bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Southern African Development Community, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the European Union have raised concerns in their public statements about the large number of fatalities.”
Documented Individual Case (Human Rights Watch): 30 October, ~3:30 PM: Resident of Dar es Salaam’s Temeke district reported neighbour (not participating in protests) shot and killed outside his home by a man in civilian clothes.
Comparative Context: If the 2,000 death toll confirmed, it would exceed the 2007–2008 Kenyan crisis following the 2007 elections, making this Tanzania’s deadliest post-election violence in the country’s history.
Intelligence Assessment: For analytical purposes, the most credible estimate range: 100–700+ killed, with the possibility of a higher toll pending independent verification. The wide variance reflects: (1) systematic government obstruction of documentation, (2) active interference with body recovery and burial, (3) allegations of mass disposal of remains, (4) communication blackout during the critical period, and (5) a climate of fear preventing witnesses from coming forward.
Methods: Security forces used live ammunition, severe beatings, and indiscriminate firing at unarmed demonstrators and civilians.
Geographic Spread: Fatalities were reported in at least 8 of Tanzania’s 31 regions.
Disorder Metrics: Approximately 70 unprecedented disorder events took place between 29–31 October, indicating nationwide unrest.
Government Crackdown
Internet Shutdown: Nationwide or wide-reaching shutdown from 29 October to 3 November, totaling six days. Social media restrictions persisted beyond general internet restoration.
Lockdown: A 24-hour lockdown was effectively imposed from 29 October to 3 November. Shops closed for three days after election day; allowed to open briefly on 2 November. Lockdown prevented residents from leaving their homes to buy food and get money from banks.
Curfew: Dusk-to-dawn curfews were enforced in several locations. Officially lifted several days after imposition.
Media Restrictions: Suspensions and restrictions on critical publications. Foreign journalists largely banned; the International Press Association of East Africa reported that no known international media journalists received accreditation for mainland coverage. Lockdown prevented domestic journalists from reporting.
Control of Remains: Strict government control over the return of bodies and funeral arrangements, particularly in Dar es Salaam, with allegations of mass graves and covert corpse disposal.
Police Warning: Police barred people from sharing photos and videos “that cause panic” after images of dead bodies began circulating when the internet was restored.
Verification Challenges: Multiple hospitals and health clinics are “too afraid to talk directly” to the media (AFP reporting).
Official Narrative: Inspector-General of Tanzania Police Force Camillus Wambura blamed “illegal immigrants” for inciting the protests and demanded citizens report suspicious foreigners. Army chief Jacob Mkunda condemned the violence and called protesters “criminals.”
Regional Economic Impact: The unrest affected neighbouring countries’ economies; at the border crossings of Songwe and Kasumulu between Malawi and Tanzania, transporters reported trucks stranded, customs offices vandalised, and fuel supplies disrupted. Malawi’s dependence on Tanzanian ports and trade routes magnified the impact. Unrest spilt into Kenya’s Namanga border town as clashes near the frontier disrupted cross-border trade, with tear gas fired and shops closing.
International Response: The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office advised against “all but essential travel to Tanzania,” stating “there are shortages of food, fuel and cash, compounded by the lack of internet services.” A joint statement by the foreign ministers of Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom cited “credible reports of a large number of fatalities and significant injuries” and concern that “the run-up to the elections was marked by harassment, abductions and intimidation of opposition figures, journalists and civil society actors.”
Exploitation Potential – Terrorism and Extremism
High Risk: The coastal regions, historically targeted by Al-Shabaab propaganda, may see increased recruitment efforts leveraging anger at state violence and perceived marginalisation.
Medium Risk: ADF/ISIS-DRC and other armed actors could exploit instability around Lake Tanganyika to infiltrate or expand logistical networks.
Grievances: Local populations traumatised by security force abuses are likely to develop deep resentment, potentially lowering barriers to extremist messaging.
Regional Impact: Tanzania’s long-standing reputation as a stable anchor in East Africa has been damaged, complicating regional counterterrorism cooperation and joint operations.
The Tanzanian crisis underscores how rapid political breakdown and heavy-handed security responses can create openings for extremist actors, even in states previously considered relatively stable.
Counterterrorism Wins and High-Value Target Eliminations
High-Value Targets Eliminated (12 October – 15 November 2025)
Table 1: High-Value Targets (HVTs) Impacted During the Reporting Period
*Note: Brig. Gen. Uba’s death is a significant terrorist success rather than a counterterrorism win and is included here to reflect the impact on state command structures.
Major Counterterrorism Operations
Somalia
Between February and November 2025, an estimated 868 Al-Shabaab militants were killed in airstrikes, according to the Somali Defence Minister. US AFRICOM conducted multiple strikes targeting Al-Shabaab, including operations approximately 55 km northeast of Kismayo. In early October 2025, Somali and Ugandan forces recaptured Awdheegle, a strategic town in Lower Shabelle, undermining Al-Shabaab control in the region.
Pakistan
In October 2025, security forces reportedly killed 355 insurgents, the highest monthly total in a decade. On 15–16 November 2025, two IBOs in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region resulted in the killing of 15 TTP-linked terrorists, including the ring leader Alam Mehsud. Between 2023 and 2025, Pakistani authorities disrupted about 15 ISIS-K online recruitment networks, demonstrating a proactive cyber-counterterrorism posture.
Mali
FAMa and Russian Africa Corps forces continued offensive operations against JNIM and other militants. However, several operations devolved into large-scale massacres of civilians (Kamona, Balle, Markala), generating significant grievances and undermining the legitimacy of counterterrorism efforts.
Assessment: The current approach risks fueling radicalisation and strengthening insurgent narratives.
Nigeria
Nigerian forces maintain continuous operations against ISWAP and Boko Haram in the northeast. Despite these efforts, ISWAP has overrun at least 15 military positions in 2025, capturing equipment and inflicting heavy casualties.
Assessment: Nigeria faces structural challenges in force protection, intelligence, and local governance that limit the effectiveness of kinetic operations alone.
Strategic Analysis
Key Trends Observed (12 October – 15 November 2025)
Jihadist Territorial Expansion JNIM: Expanded operational reach from the Sahel into north-central Nigeria with its first acknowledged attack in Kwara State, indicating potential for deeper penetration into the Gulf of Guinea region.
ISSP: Demonstrated increased capability to operate in Niger’s urban centres, notably Niamey, through high-risk operations such as kidnapping a US national. ISIS-K: Sustained presence in the Afghanistan–Pakistan theatre, with continued recruitment and intermittent attacks.
Al-Shabaab: Despite heavy counterterrorism pressure, the group executed complex attacks in Somalia’s capital and maintained rural strongholds.
Economic Warfare Tactics: In Mali, JNIM’s fuel blockade against Bamako is a notable escalation from purely kinetic operations to infrastructure and supply-chain targeting. The strategy aims to demonstrate government incapacity, disrupt daily life, and force foreign evacuations, thereby amplifying perceptions of state weakness.
Inter-Jihadist Rivalry: The ISWAP vs Boko Haram clash at Dogon Chiku (around 200 militants killed) highlights intense competition for control of resources, recruits, and territory in the Lake Chad Basin. In the broader Sahel, JNIM and ISSP compete for dominance, sometimes resulting in mutual attrition that, while costly for militants, does not necessarily translate into improved civilian security.
Targeting of Civilians DRC: The ADF/ISIS-DRC attack on Byambwe hospital represents a particularly egregious example of deliberate targeting of vulnerable civilians, including mothers and newborns.
Mali: State-aligned forces (FAMa and Dozo militias) perpetrated massacres in Kamona, Balle, and Markala, blurring the line between counterterrorism and atrocities.
Somalia: Al-Shabaab’s repeated attacks on prisons and urban targets endanger civilians and undermine state authority.
Mozambique: Beheadings and attacks on Christian communities by ISIS-Mozambique highlight the sectarian and ideological brutality of the insurgency.
Political Instability as Terrorist Opportunity Tanzania: Massive post-election violence, internet shutdowns, and allegations of mass graves risk long-term delegitimisation of state institutions.
Cameroon: Deadly electoral crackdowns and arbitrary arrests create a pool of disaffected youth vulnerable to radicalisation.
Assessment: Jihadist groups are likely to exploit these crises by positioning themselves as defenders of oppressed communities and by infiltrating protest movements or security vacuums.
Far-Right Transnational Coordination: Neo-Nazi networks in Germany and the US illustrate the increasingly transnational character of far-right extremism, leveraging darknet platforms, encrypted channels, and cryptocurrency. Darknet assassination marketplaces and cross-border propaganda underscore the need for international law enforcement cooperation analogous to that used against jihadist networks.
Military Effectiveness Challenges
Nigeria: Repeated base overruns and high-profile losses (e.g., Brig. Gen. Uba) indicate persistent deficiencies in intelligence, force protection, and local trust-building.
Mali: Reliance on foreign mercenaries and indiscriminate operations has undermined state legitimacy and may strengthen JNIM’s narrative.
Pakistan: High militant casualties mask the resilience of TTP and ISIS-K networks; kinetic pressure alone has not eliminated the threat.
Overall, the period demonstrates that sustainable gains require governance reforms, community engagement, and rights-respecting security practices, not only kinetic operations.
Five-Week Tempo Comparison
Weekly Activity Overview (12 October – 15 November 2025)
Week 1 (12–18 October): Rising tensions and operational tempo in Mali, including preparatory stages for later massacres. ISSP operations in Niger, notably the Bagaroua attack on 18 October (2 security forces killed).
Week 2 (19–25 October): ISSP executed the Niamey kidnapping of a US missionary on 21 October, signalling urban penetration. Mali saw intensifying violence with the Markala massacre on 23 October. In Sudan, the recapture of Bara on 25 October led to high civilian casualties.
Week 3 (26 October – 1 November): – Highest Activity Week
Sudan: El Fasher falls to RSF on 26 October, with over 1,300 killed in the initial days and a total of more than 2,000 deaths nationwide by week’s end.
Tanzania: Post-election violence erupts starting 29 October, rapidly escalating into one of the deadliest political crises in the country’s recent history.
Cameroon: Post-election protests and crackdowns begin around 27 October.
Nigeria: JNIM conducts its first attack in Nigeria at Nuku, Kwara State, on 28 October.
Pakistan: Cumulative October total of 355 insurgents killed reported by authorities.
Week 4 (2–8 November)
Tanzania: The crisis continues, with some estimates suggesting up to 2,000 killed by 2 November.
Mali: The fuel blockade and mounting massacres prompt renewed international evacuation advisories.
Cameroon: “Dead cities” protest and lockdown between 4–7 November create pervasive instability.
Week 5 (9–15 November)
Nigeria: The ISWAP–Boko Haram battle at Dogon Chiku on 10 November leads to approximately 200 militant deaths.
Germany: Darknet neo-Nazi assassination platform suspect Martin S. arrested on 11 November.
DRC: The Byambwe hospital massacre on 14–15 November results in 20–29 civilian deaths.
Pakistan: Twin IBOs on 15–16 November kill 15 terrorists, including Alam Mehsud.
Nigeria: Capture and execution of Brig. Gen. Musa Uba on 14–17 November highlights a severe threat to senior military leadership.
Geographic Shifts
Highest Intensity: Sudan (El Fasher and nationwide violence, 26 Oct–1 Nov) and Tanzania (post-election crackdown, 29 Oct–3 Nov).
Sustained Operations: Sahel states (Mali, Niger) and the Lake Chad Basin (Nigeria, Cameroon) experienced continuous jihadist and political violence. Expansion Zones: JNIM’s extension into Nigeria and ISSP’s encroachment into urban Niger mark new geographic frontiers for Sahelian jihadism.
Outlook and Intelligence Gaps
What to Watch in the Next Period
Risk of Mali State Collapse: Whether JNIM escalates its campaign towards an overt offensive on Bamako or continues economic attrition tactics.
Tanzania’s Post-Crisis Trajectory: The degree to which grievances evolve into organised resistance or become exploited by jihadist groups, especially along the coast.
JNIM in Nigeria: Indicators of further attacks or recruitment in north-central and northern Nigeria, and potential linkage with local extremist cells (particularly Ansaru). Monitor for operational coordination between JNIM and Ansaru; track Nigerian security response and border fortification measures in Kwara, Niger, and Kaduna States.
ISWAP Momentum: ISWAP’s operational behaviour after the high-profile killing of Brig. Gen. Uba, including possible morale effects and targeting of additional senior officers.
ISIS-K in Afghanistan: Clarifying ISIS-K’s operational tempo and external plotting capability amid limited open-source data.
Far-Right Prosecutions: Progress of major far-right cases in the US and Germany, and whether arrests disrupt or merely fragment networks.
Key Intelligence Gaps
Afghanistan – ISIS-K: Insufficient specific incident data for the 12 October–15 November period, complicating precise trend analysis.
Yemen – AQAP: Limited and fragmented reporting on AQAP operations during the reporting window.
Burkina Faso: Need for more detailed, incident-level data beyond aggregate attack counts to understand spatial patterns and perpetrators.
Ethiopia: Minimal open-source reporting on terrorism-related incidents for the period, requiring enhanced monitoring.
North Africa (Tunisia/Algeria): Incomplete coverage of jihadist activity, especially in border and desert regions.
Far-Right Attacks vs Arrests: Data often emphasises arrests and prosecutions; better distinction is required between actual attacks, foiled plots, and non-violent extremist activities.
Casualty Verification: Wide variance in casualty estimates (especially in Tanzania, Sudan, Cameroon) underscores the need for improved verification mechanisms.
Methodology and Source Quality
Primary Sources
Human Rights Watch (multiple country reports on Mali, Tanzania, Cameroon).
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) – Africa Overview, November 2025.
International media: The Guardian, Al Jazeera, Reuters, Washington Post, BBC, New York Times, CNN.
US government: US Department of Justice; US CENTCOM; US AFRICOM.
Specialised research: Soufan Centre; Institute for Security Studies (ISS Africa); HumAngle; Africa Defence Forum.
National security communications: Pakistani ISPR; Somalia Defence Ministry; Nigerian Army.
UN bodies: Including OCHA, OHCHR, and African Commission-linked reporting.
Source Verification Approach
Major incidents were cross-referenced across multiple reputable outlets and datasets where possible. Casualty figures are presented as ranges when sources diverged; narrative text highlights where numbers are contested or unverified. Claims with limited corroboration, particularly in high-censorship environments (e.g., Tanzania), are explicitly flagged as estimates.
Limitations
Internet shutdowns and media restrictions (notably in Tanzania and Cameroon) significantly constrained real-time reporting and verification.
Many conflict zones (e.g., eastern DRC, rural Mali, parts of Sudan) are logistically inaccessible, increasing reliance on secondary reporting and local networks.
Some casualty figures reflect government or opposition sources with inherent biases; triangulation reduces but does not eliminate this risk. ISIS-K activity in Afghanistan and AQAP in Yemen remain partially obscured by limited open-source coverage for the specific period.
Far-right extremism data is skewed toward law-enforcement announcements and may underrepresent unreported plots or low-level violence.